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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume XIX AUTUMN 1969 Number 1
REVOKE THE LEGAL LICENSE TO KILL
CONSTRUCTION WORKERS
HARRY M. PHILO*
INTRODUCTIONMORE than 2,700 construction workers are killed and 250,000
injured in the course of their employment annually in the
United States.' This is a national disgrace which is caused
primarily by the failure of lawyers, judges and legislators, as social
architects, to meet their responsibility to fashion the law in such a way
as to minimize the conflicts in construction and to prevent the hazards
which exist in this industry from causing injury or death. The social
responsibility for reducing the 2,700 deaths and 250,000 disabling
injuries annually in construction lies not only with lawyers, judges
and legislators, but primarily with the plaintiff's trial bar. This
tragic toll is mute testimony to its past inadequacies and failures.
There is no reason for serious construction injuries and deaths.
The owners who undertake construction carefully through outside
contractors can minimize the risks which inhere in the operation.
The duPont Corporation, for example, has had some two million
construction workers on its projects in the last twenty years; if their
* Mr. PHILo received his J.D. from Detroit College of Law. He is a member
of the Michigan Bar and is currently a partner in the law firm of Philo, Maki, Ravitz,
Glotta, Adelman, Cockrel & Robb in Detroit. Mr. PHILO is a frequent lecturer on
tort liability and is co-author of LAWYERS DESK REFERENCE.
1. This figure has increased since 1961 and the latest figures indicate that they
may be higher than 2,700. See 1966 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 245. Another indication of the seriousness of the
problem is that contract construction industries had frequency rates twice as high,
and severity rates three times as high, as manufacturing. See 342 U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS REPORT, INJURY RATES: BY INDUSTRY 18 (1964-65).
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accident rate determined the national total, there would only be 45
construction deaths and 4,300 injuries annually.2
Construction workers are injured and killed because of illogical,
unwarranted and unconstitutional immunity granted to those who
profit by unsafe construction: the owners, the contractors, the archi-
tects and engineers, and the distributors of unsafe equipment.
Common law courts have failed to understand that construction acci-
dents can be eliminated, but that their elimination is a sophisticated
task and the courts' granting of immunity is the greatest single hin-
drance to construction safety. Further, the courts fail to perceive
that they are incapable, legally and practically, of framing rules of
behavior that amount to rules of law simply because they do not know
anything about accident prevention in construction.
In many jurisdictions, the courts have denied plaintiffs due process
and equal protection of the law by granting immunity from suit to
employers of contractors, as to injuries suffered by employees of the
contractor, while requiring the remainder of society to use due care.
As soon as the courts adopt the simple common law rule which
imposes on every person engaged in the prosecution of an undertaking
an obligation to use due care or to govern his actions so as not to un-
reasonably endanger the person or property of others, then liability
costs will exceed accident prevention costs on the graphs and safety
will result.8
If our common law develops as it must and places legal liability
on those whose lack of care causes construction injuries and death,
then the death toll will be less than one hundred each year and the
injury toll will decline to less than 10,000 annually. This has begun
to happen.
In the past two years there have been several important decisions
revoking the legal license of principals,4 architects,5 and insurance
2. See McElroy, Specifying Safety in Contracts, Nat'l Safety News, April,
1964, at 20.
3. For an analysis of how this safety will follow see Graphic Trees Help Study
of Reliability v. Cost, PRODUCT ENGINEERING, Jan. 30, 1967, at 48.
4. Hamilton v. Armstrong Cork Co., 371 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1967); Associated
Engineers Inc. v. Job, 370 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1967); Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68
Cal. Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508 (1968); McDonald v. City of Oakland, 63 Cal. Rptr.
593 (1967); Giarratano v. The Weitz Co. Inc., 259 Iowa 1292, 147 N.W.2d 824
(1967).
5. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Holt v. A.L. Salz-
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companies to kill construction workers by their adopting of inade-
quate safety specifications or allowing sloppy performance. In one
instance, an appellate court approved punitive damages against an
owner who knowingly adopted inadequate specifications, and who
knowingly allowed negligent performance. 7
In a recent case, the United States, as the landowner of a light-
house in Muskegon Harbor, was held liable for the damages sus-
tained by an independent contractor's employee who fell from the
unguarded lighthouse platform.
The United States contracted with the Whittaker Electric Co. to repair a light-
house located on a breakwater. Gowdy, one of Whittaker Electric's employees, had
a number of jobs to perform in conjunction with the repairs, including assisting in
the removal and replacement of the steel door of the machinery room (located in
the lighthouse) at the beginning and end of each working day. The door was re-
moved and replaced through the use of a chain hoist. . . . To operate the lift...
Gowdy had to stand about one foot from the edge of the roof, lean forward toward
the edge of the roof, and reach over his head with one of his hands to grasp the
end of the ratchet hoist handle. The ratchet was about eighteen inches long.
Because of his height, Gowdy was only able to reach approximately three inches of
the handle of the ratchet. While in this position, Gowdy lost his balance and fell
from the top of the roof to the concrete foundation below. Gowdy sustained seri-
ous injuries including comminuted fractures of both heels which caused, besides pain
and suffering, hospitalization and treatment over an extended period of time, loss of
earnings, and medical expenses.
The trial was held before the court without a jury. The court awarded damages
of $289,248.82.8
This case, Gowdy v. United States, is a landmark case because it is
the first common law decision which states with clarity for all to read
that an owner employing an independent contractor owes to em-
ployees of the independent contractor the duty of due care.
Also important is that the trial judge criticized "open sesame
phrases" and "honorary degrees," pointing out that in situations
where there is fault resulting in harm to another, some courts have
excused the wrongdoer by holding that there was no duty owed by
the wrongdoer to the injured party. However, what Judge Fox said
man & Sons, 88 Ill. App. 2d 306, 232 N.E.2d 537 (1967); Nauman v. Harold K.
Beecher & Associates, 19 Utah 2d 101, 426 P.2d 621 (1967); Mallow v. Tucker,
Sadler & Bennett, Architects & Eng., Inc., 245 Cal. App. 2d 245, 54 Cal. Rptr. 174
(1966).
6. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corporation, 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769
(1964).
7. Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Company and City of Philadelphia, 282 F.
Supp. 667 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
8. 271 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. Mich. 1967), rev'd 412 F.2d 525 (1969).
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in Gowdy, with caustic decisiveness, was simply a clarification of an
early Michigan case involving negligent injury to an employee of an
independent contractor by an owner's lack of care.' Citing the
earlier Michigan decision, he noted:
Justice Voelker's admonition to analyze all of the evidence in each case and to
avoid uncritical application of general rules is particularly appropriate to the present
case, since the thinking inherent in such "open sesame phrases" as whether a
danger was obvious, or whether defendant controlled the employees of the inde-
pendent contractor, or whether there was a duty owing plaintiff from defendant,
could make for simple and swift resolution of this case, despite a multitude of
facts and circumstances which militate to the contrary.
Some courts in situations where there is fault resulting in harm to another have
excused the wrongdoer from liability by saying there was no duty owed by the
wrongdoer to the injured party ....
It is important . . . to distinguish . . .between the problem of restricting liability
to a negligent party, and the problem of restricting the liability of the defendant
even though he was negligent. . . . This distinction . . . is one that is fundamental
to an understanding of cases involving personal injuries for open and obvious
danger. 10
The United States was found liable in Gowdy because the court
found: That the government, as a principal employing an independ-
ent contractor, had not as a matter of fact used due care; that the
plaintiff was in the "target area of protection"; and that it was reason-
ably foreseeable that Mr. Gowdy could be injured by that lack of due
care.
Although this article is intended to advocate a dramatic change in
the law along doctrinal lines, following the Gowdy rationale, never-
theless the common denominator and policy goal prevalent through-
out will be accident prevention. This policy of reducing job hazards
and preventing injury and death will be analyzed in a historical
perspective in order to show the reasons for the development of the
principal's immunity in construction torts, and to posit arguments for
its eradication in light of modern day conditions. An attempt will
be made to show how duty as a tort concept has been used by those
who would keep society in the dark ages and by those who are not
capable of understanding, to thwart the development of any mean-
ingful elimination of the construction negligence which causes injury
and death.
Finally, a definitive statement of the law of liability will be sug-
9. Johnson v. Spear, 76 Mich. 139, 42 N.W. 1092 (1889).
10. Gowdy v. United States, supra note 8, at 739.
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gested which might assist in bringing about a return to the liability
that existed a century ago.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The general rule as to the non-liability of an employer for physical
harm caused to another by the act or omission of an independent
contractor was the original common law rule. The explanation most
commonly given for it is that, since the employer has no power of
control over the manner in which the work is to be done by the
contractor, it is to be regarded as the contractor's own enterprise,
and he, rather than the employer, is the proper party to be charged
with the responsibility of preventing the risk, and bearing and dis-
tributing it.
The first departure from the old common law rule was in Bower
v. Peate," in which an employer was held liable when the founda-
tion of the plaintiff's building was undermined by the contractor's
excavation. Since that decision, the law has progressed by the recog-
nition of a large number of "exceptions" to the "general rule."' 2
They are so numerous, and they have so far eroded the "general
rule," that it can now be said to be "general" only in the sense that it
is applied where no good reason is found for departing from it.
As was said in Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co.:
"Indeed it would be proper to say that the rule is now primarily im-
portant as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions."' 3
Most authorities' 4 contend that the theory of respondeat superior
and the exceptions to that rule, of which the above is an example, are
of very recent origin. The very early common law developed with
the premise that an individual should not be responsible for another
person's tortious conduct.1" This early immunity was compromised
with the doctrine of respondeat superior, which emerged due to the
11. 1 Q.B.D. 321 (1876).
12. These exceptions are stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 410-29 (1965).
13. 201 Minn. 500, 227 N.W. 226 (1937).
14. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 480-81 (3d ed. 1964).
15. "However, our common law when it took shape in Edward I's day did not,
unless we are much misled, make masters pay for acts that they had neither com-
manded nor ratified. Had it done so, it would have 'punished' a man for an of-
fence in which he had no part." II POLLACK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 533-34 (2d ed. 1903), citing Bogode Clare's case (1290) Rot. Parl. i. 24.
1969]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
recognition that the master could more easily compensate the plaintiff
than his servant.1" The early Anglo-Saxon law declared this liability
as absolute:
The doer of a deed was responsible whether he acted innocently, because he was the
doer; the owner of an instrument which caused harm was responsible, because he
was the owner, though the instrument had been wielded by a thief; the owner of an
animal, the master of a slave, was responsible because he was associated with it
as owner, as master .... 17
The development of respondeat superior and its attendant out-
growth of employer immunity is a good example of common law
judges being willing to compromise rules in order to satisfy public
policy."8 The prevalent economic thought at the time was char-
acterized by laissez-faire and the judicial encouragement of individ-
ualistic industrial enterprise whose burdens were made as light as
possible in order to facilitate general expediency." ' As late as 1685,
the common law judges were still following the medieval rule that the
master was not responsible for the torts of his servant.2" It was not
16. See Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History-I, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 315, 330 (1894), for the discussion of the historical antecedents of the
master's liability for harms connected with the servant. See also Morris, The Torts
of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REV. 339 (1934) for an excellent anal-
ysis of the development of respondeat superior and the entrepreneur theory of
liability.
17. See III WIGMORE, SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 480
(1909), cited in PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 463 (5th
ed. 1956). Also included in presentation of the historical extract of early Anglo-
Saxon liability is the following passage from the laws of Aethelred which indicate
this rule of respondeat superior was flexible and not as harsh as would appear.
"And always the greater a man's position in this present life or the higher the privi-
leges of his rank, the more full shall he make amends for his sins, and the more
dearly shall pay for all misdeeds; for the strong and the weak are not alike nor
can they bear alike burden, any more than the sick can be treated like the sound.
And, therefore, in forming a judgment, careful discrimination must be made between
age and youth, wealth and poverty, health and sickness, and the various ranks of
life, both in the amends imposed by ecclesiastical authority, and in the penalties
inflicted by the secular law. And if it happens that a man commits a misdeed in-
voluntarily or unintentionally; and likewise he who is involuntary agent in his
misdeeds should always be entitled to clemency and better terms, owing to the fact
that he has acted as involuntary agent." PLUCKNETT, at 464.
18. For a statutory development and trend in this direction, see POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 533 n.l. The practical application and consequences of
such a rule were effected by the circumstances surrounding the Industrial Revolution.
19. This theory is suggested by E.H. DOWNEY, HISTOY OF WORK ACCIDENT
IMMUNITY IN IOWA (1912) and Walter F. Dodd, Administration of Workmen's
Compensation, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (1938) cited in I LARSON, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 26 nn. c. 8 & 9.
20. Kingston v. Booth, Skinner 228, 90 Eng. Rep. 105 (1685). For a statement
of the facts and holding of this case, see Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts:
Its History-lI, 7 HARv. L. REV. 383, 391 (1894).
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until 1691 that the rule of respondeat superior was actually judicially
enunciated. In Boston v. Sandford21 the issue was whether the
owners of a ship were responsible for goods received by the master
and spoiled by his negligence. Lord Holt declared that "[t]he own-
ers are liable in respect of the freight and as employing the master;
for whoever employs another is answerable for him, and undertakes
for his care to all that make use of him. ' 2   Holt was basing the em-
ployer's liability on the broadest base of convenience and general
policy of social duty. 3
Although a distinction is ascertainable between the early rule of
absolute liability for tortious conduct and the vicarious liability of an
innocent master for unauthorized torts of his servant,24 a sense of its
harshness with respect to the business conditions of the time, and a
desire to restrict its operation are mainly responsible for employer
immunity. In 1799 the problem of an independent contractor was
for the first time clearly presented in Bush v. Steinman.25 In that
case, A, having a house, contracted with B to repair it for a fixed sum.
B then contracted with C to do the work, and C contracted with D
to furnish the materials. The servant of D placed lime on the road
in front of A's premises, by reason of which plaintiff's carriage
collided with the lime, injuring plaintiff. The court held that A,
the owner, was liable in damages to plaintiff, although a satisfactory
basis for the decision was not exposited. However, Chief Justice
Eyre, alluding to an earlier decision, said:
A master having employed his servant to do some work, the servant out of idleness
employed another to do it, and that person, in carrying into execution the orders
which had been given to the servant, committed an injury to the plaintiff for
which the master was held liable. The responsibility was thrown on the principal
from whom the authority originally moved. This determination is certainly highly
convenient and beneficial to the public. Where a civil injury of the kind now com-
plained of has been sustained, the remedy ought to be obvious, and the person in-
jured should have only to discover the owner of the house which was the occasion of
the mischief not be compelled to enter into concerns between that owner and other
persons, the inconvenience of which would be most heavily felt than any which can
arise from a circuity of action. 26
21. 91 Eng. Rep. 382, 2 Salk 440 (1691).
22. Id.
23. Contra, I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430 (4th ed. 1914).
24. See Hayser, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent
Contractor, 10 IND. L.J. 494, 495-6 (1935). The continuity of principle is evident
in early English case law.
25. 1 Bos. & P. 404 (1799).
26. Id. at 408.
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Justice Brooke added:
I am of the same opinion. He who has work going on for his benefit, and on his
own premises, must be civilly answerable for the acts of those whom he employs.
. . . He ought to reserve such control. And if he deprives himself of it, the law
should not permit him to take advantage of that circumstance in order to screen
himself from an action. . . . The person from whom the authority is originally
derived is the person who ought to be answerable, and great inconvenience would
follow if it were otherwise. 2 7
Although the struggle to find a legal principle upon which to base
a decision is clearly evident, the judges in Bush v. Steinman denied
the defendant immunity on the grounds of respondeat superior and
that an owner of real estate is liable for damages resulting from work
negligently done upon his land as well as off.
From 1826 through 1876, the English common law courts,
troubled by the sweeping rule of Bush in which the principal was
held liable on a respondeat superior doctrine for off-premises in-
juries, whittled away at the rule and gave immunity to the principal
employing an independent contractor for off-premises injuries. Af-
ter Bush two minor decisions28 followed the rationale enunciated
therein, but in 1826 in Laugher v. Pointer" the immunity of the
owner was first developed. In that case the owner of a carriage who
had hired horses and a driver from a livery stable was held not
responsible for the negligent operation of the carriage by the driver.
The English bench in Laugher v. Pointer examined Bush, found
it wanting in precedental vigor, and distinguished it factually. As a
result of that decision, decisions which followed Laugher also dis-
tinguished Bush as being concerned only with injuries involving
realty. 0 The Bush rationale was finally discarded and complete
insulation was established in Reedie v. London & N. W. Ry.3" Baron
Rolfes' decision in Reedie was simply that the employer could not be
held liable on the principles of respondeat superior. What is of vital
importance was his acknowledgement that the owner of land might
27. Id. at 409-10.
28. Sly v. Elgley, 6 Esp. 6 (1806), where a bricklayer who was employed to
clean a sewer left open an excavation into which the plaintiff fell, and Mathews v.
West London Waterworks Co., 3 Compl. 403 (1813), where contractors laying
pipes threw rubbish into street and stage coach was wrecked.
29. 5 B. & C. 547 (1826).
30. See Comment, Responsibility for the Torts of an Independent Contractor,
39 YALE L.J. 861, 863 n.9 (1930).
31. 4 Ex. 244 (1849).
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be liable for damage caused by another not his servant. Such liabil-
ity "must be founded on the principle that he has not taken due
care to prevent the doing of acts which it was his duty to prevent,
whether done by his servants or others.' '1 2  Thus the employer was
given full insulation and it was not until a quarter of a century later
that the judges were able to make inroads upon it.
Moreover, the initial decision in which an employer was held liable
was based not upon the existence of a responsibility enacted by
statute. In Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumer's Co.,33 in which plain-
tiff stumbled over a pile of stones left in a pathway by employees of
an independent contractor, the work was illegal because no permit
had been procured for its continuance. The court held the employer
liable on the ground that the principal cause of the accident was the
illegal act for which the defendant had contracted.
The courts, however, came to recognize that the liability of the
principal had to be much broader and soon devised a number of
exceptional situations wherein a general employer could not relieve
himself from liability for negligent injuries by the simple means of
employing an independent contractor. In Pickard v. Smith, 4 wherein
a coal dealer negligently left open a coal hole, the doctrine was first
promulgated that the duty of the employer in such a situation to take
precautions was one he could not avoid by entrusing it to another.
Mr. Justice Williams found that the defendant was under a duty
to the plaintiff and asserted:
The defendant employed the coal merchant to open the trap in order to put in the
coals; and he trusted him to guard it whilst open, and to close it when the coals
were all put in. The act of opening it was the act of the employer, though done
through the agency of the coal merchant; and the defendant, having thereby caused
danger, was bound to take reasonable means to prevent mischief. The per-
formance of this duty he omitted; and the fact of his having intrusted it to a per-
son who also neglected it, furnishes no excuse, either in good sense or law.85
This rationale was followed by Gray v. Pullen"' wherein the em-
ployer was held responsible for a contractor's negligence in filling a
drain, the theory being that the act authorizing the defendant to break
32. Id. at 256.
33. 2 E. & B. 767 (1853).
34. 10 C.B. (NS) 470, 142 Eng. Rep. 535 (1861).
35. Id. at 480.
36. 5 B. & S. 970 (1864). For a list of English cases following the rationale of
these decisions, see Jolowicz, Liability for Independent Contractors in the English
Common Law-A Suggestion, 9 STAN. L. REV. 690, 693 n.18 (1957).
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up the street provided that he must keep it in a safe condition. The
final and most fruitful and forceful decision in negating employer
insulation was Bower v. Peate,"7 in which an employer was held
liable when the foundation of the plaintiff's building was undermined
by the contractor's excavation. Chief Justice Cockburn placed the
employer's responsibility upon the broad ground that:
a man who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the natural course of
things, injurious consequences to his neighbour must be expected to arise, unless
means are adopted by which such consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to
the doing of that which is ncessary to prevent the mischief, and cannot relieve him-
self of his responsibility by employing some one else-whether it be the contractor
employed to do the work from which the danger arises or some independent per-
son-to do what is necessary to prevent the act he has ordered to be done from
becoming wrongful. 8
The development of the law in America followed the two trends
coinciding with the Bush v. Steinman and Laugher v. Pointer dichot-
omy. A number of early decisions held the employer responsible on
the ratio decidendi that he was the "author" of the work. 9 How-
ever, the doctrine which was accepted as the prevailing view seemed
to be influenced by the rationale of Laugher v. Pointer.4" The in-
congruity in the development of the law is that Bower v. Peate,
standing for the proposition that an employer is liable for injuries
37. Supra note 11.
38. Supra note 11, at 326 (emphasis added).
39. In Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R.R., 23 Pick. 24 (Mass. 1839), the court
stated that the employer was liable because "The work was done for their benefit,
under their authority and by their direction. They are therefore to be regarded as
the principals, and it is immaterial whether the work was done under contract for
a stipulated sum or workmen employed directly by the defendant's at lay wages.
This question was fully discussed and settled in the case of Bush v. Steinman." Id.
at 31. In Stone v. Cheshire R. Co., 19 N.H. 427 (1849), the plaintiff was injured
by the blasting of a contractor hired by defendant. The court said: "Now in this
case the soundness of the decision in Bush v. Steinman is not questioned nor is
there any inconsistency between the two cases. . . . The railroad corporation
made a contract with certain persons to construct a part of the railroad. . . . The
defendants employed the persons that did the injury, and we are not aware that to
such a state of facts the case of Bush v. Steinman and the other cases in accordance
with it, have been held to be inapplicable, or their doctrine considered as un-
sound." Id. at 441-42.
40. In Blake v. Ferris, 5 N.Y. 48 (1851), the general rule was laid down that an
employer is not liable for the tortious acts of an independent contractor or his
servants, and Bush v. Steinman was repudiated as it was in England. However, just
as in England, the American courts sensing the harshness of the rule in certain
cases decided to qualify it with certain measurements, which in actuality re-
asserted Bush v. Steinman. A valuable and exhaustive summary of the New York
cases in this area may be found in NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 411-688 (1939).
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caused by the independent contractor's failure to use due care in the
performance of work which is "inherently" or "intrinsically danger-
ous," has been given merely lip service by the American judiciary. A
careful analysis of Bower v. Peate shows that the presumed fault
aspect of the case-albeit to a lesser degree than the absolute liabil-
ity theory of Rylands v. Fletcher41-limited the application of Bower
v. Peate to certain details of the work, but, as so qualified, made it
apply to all transactions wherever likelihood of harm to third persons
was reasonably foreseeable. Chief Justice Cockburn's argument in
Bower was as follows:
[The] case is therefore an authority for saying that where a work is being
executed from which danger may arise to another, and it thereby becomes incumbent
on the party doing or ordering it to be done to take measures to prevent damage
resulting to others, he cannot divest himself of liability by transferring the duty to
a contractor.
42
The "intrinsically dangerous" doctrine, 43 although applied as an
exception to the general rule by most courts,44 cannot be reconciled
with the remaining language of Bower v. Peate. The concept of who
was responsible to ensure prevention of injury was summarized by
Cockburn in these words:
There is an obvious difference between committing work to a contractor to be
executed from which, if properly done no injurious consequences can arise, and
handing over to him work to be done from which mischievous consequences will
arise unless preventive measures are adopted. While it may be just to hold the
party authorizing the work in the former case exempt from liability for injury,
resulting from negligence which he had no reason to anticipate, there is, on the
other hand, good ground for holding him liable for injury caused by an act certain
to be attended with injurious consequences if such consequences are not in fact pre-
vented, no matter through whose default the omission to take the necessary measures
for such prevention may arise. 4 5
An early Michigan decision, Johnson v. Spear,46 followed Bower v.
Peate in theory and held that:
As between the employer and his employees, it is the duty of the master to furnish
suitable machinery, and to see that it is kept in proper repair, and he is bound to
41. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). See Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good
Life, 2 U. CI. L. REV. 501, 505 (1934).
42. Supra note 11, at 329.
43. The first use of the concept "intrinsically dangerous" work seems to be in
DILLION, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 792 (1st ed. 1872).
44. For a collection of these decisions, see 41 CAN. L.J. 49, 159 (1905) and
66 L.R.A. 941 (1905).
45. Supra note 11, at 327.
46. 76 Mich. 139, 42 N.W. 1092 (1889).
1969]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
exercise reasonable care to prevent accidents. His duty is not discharged by fur-
nishing suitable machinery and appliances in the first instance, and fit and proper
for carrying on the business, but he is in duty bound to see that they are kept so.
He must exercise reasonable and proper watchfulness as to their condition, and
guard against dangers liable to arise from ordinary wear and use from which they
may become weakened or unfit for the purpose for which they are supplied ...
The principles above enunciated apply to the relation of master and servant. It
does not follow, however, that the defendant is not liable for injuries which may
be received by those persons employed by his contractor to unload vessels at his
dock. If the injuries result from the negligence of the defendant while work is
being done upon his premises, and through his fault in not keeping them in a suit-
able and safe condition, he is liable to any servants of the contractor for injuries
resulting to them from defects therein; not because there is any contract obligation
between the parties, but arising out of his obligation or duty to provide safe
appliances for the servants of the contractor to use, and to keep his premises upon
which such servants are at work in a reasonably safe condition, whether the con-
tract provides for it or not.4 7
However, just as in England, so too in America, the overwhelm-
ing political, economic, and social objective of the early twentieth
century was commercial exploitation, more euphemistically stated as
"progress."4  Bower v. Peate was forgotten. Most judicial authority
was caught in the wave of expansion and was imbued with the ideas
of individualism. Courts found it convenient to allow the contrac-
tor's business to thrive while on the other hand encouraging his em-
ployer by shielding him from liability. With these historical influ-
ences and case decisions in mind, we turn to an analysis of why the
law of principals employing contractors has not developed in relation
to modern day requirements thereby removing the immunity prin-
ciple completely.
MODERN VIEW OF PRINCIPALS EMPLOYING CONTRACTORS
RULES IN EVERY JURISDICTION CLOUDED
When the early legislative attempts resulted in an alienation of
the burden of industrial accident losses, it was assumed that the
theory underlying the compensation acts would alleviate the onerous
situation which existed at common law. Despite the rationale that
the coverage would include only those within the statutory frame-
work (those instances where employer-employee or master-servant
47. Id. at 142-43, 42 N.W. at 1092-93.
48. This development is described and analyzed in great detail by Arnold, The-
ories About Economic Theory, 172 ANNALS 26, 27 (1934).
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relation is present) the general immunity of the principal was re-
tained.
The statutory provisions apply only to those persons falling within
clearly defined categories. While the acts themselves are specific in
their definition of these categories, the great mass of litigation that has
developed under these provisions resulted from the effort to apply
the definition of a particular fact situation.
In twenty states49 the principal employing a contractor is given
immunity by a statute which makes him a "statutory employer" if the
activity conducted by the principal is in the trade or business. In
order to come within the test, a determination must be made as to
whether the particular work resulting in the injury is directly con-
nected with the commercial function of the "statutory employee" as
opposed to activities which are ancillary or incidental to that com-
mercial function.
49. New Mexico, Nevada, Idaho, Hawaii, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ver-
mont, Missouri, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Kansas,
Tennessee, Washington, Louisiana, Kentucky, Virginia, Georgia, and Oklahoma.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-291 (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-112
(1935); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 97-1 (Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-811
(1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 44-503 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.060
(1962); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 1061-1063 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 62
(1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 18 (1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.040
(1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.085 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-12.15
(Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 11 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 52
(1952); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-111 et seq. (1962); S.D. CODE § 64.0108 (1939);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-915 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65-5 et seq. (1968); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 601 (Supp. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE § 24.010 (1969). In
seven additional states: North Dakota, Mississippi, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois,
Ohio, and North Carolina, a principal employing a contractor is a statutory employer
if that contractor has not secured workmen's compensation insurance. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 81.1306 (1948); COLO. REV. STAT. § 81-9-1 (1953); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, § 138.a (1950); Miss. CODE ANN. 6998-04 (1942); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-19
(1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02 (1960).
In Texas and Nebraska, the principal is a statutory employer if he subcontracts to
avoid workmen's compensation liability. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 8306 (1948);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-101 et seq. (1943). There is no statutory immunity in the
great majority of the remaining jurisdictions. See ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 253 (1958);
ALASKA STAT. § 30.230 (1962); CAL. LABOR CODE § 3353-3357 (West 1955); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2311 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-501 (1961); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 40-2205 (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ch. 85A et seq. (1962); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 1-47 (1954); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.150 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.205 (1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-10-15 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-1:15-40 (1939); N.Y. LAW tit. 64 § 2 (McKinney 1965); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 656.154 (Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 35-58 (1956); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-2-6, 23-2-9 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.06 (1957); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 27-40-27-60 (1957).
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It is understandable that this statutory immunity clouds an already
cloudy area of the law and causes the unsophisticated substantial
problems in attempting to discern a correct statement of the law.
Much of the litigation involving principals employing independent
contractors has been under the Federal Tort Claims Act"0 since the
federal government is far and away the largest employer of contrac-
tors in annual dollar volume. Major agencies employing contrac-
tors are the Corps of Engineers, General Services Administration,
United States Navy, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Agricul-
ture and the United States Coast Guard. The federal government is
immune from suit if: the tort is willful, absolute liability is involved,
or a discretionary function is involved, and the wrongful conduct is an
act or omission of an employee of the federal government. These
exceptions have added nothing but confusion."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS NOT DEFINITIVE
Although the principal has a preferred position, it has been grad-
ually whittled away by exceptions which are so numerous, and that
have so far eroded the "general rule" that it can be said to be "general"
only in the sense that it is applied where no good reason is found
for departing from it.' 2
This list of liability-imposing exceptions indicates a concern by
the judiciary for individual rights. The exceptions are embodied
within the framework of the Restatement of the Law of Torts.5 The
exceptions'" include: (1) the personal fault of the employer; 5 (2)
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1965).
51. See Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act: An Examination of the Rule of
Nondelegable Duty, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 572-80 (1967).
52. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 481 (3d ed. 1964). See also Pacific Fire Ins.
Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 201 Minn. 500, 277 N.W. 226 (1937); Van
Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra note 4, at 25, 437 P.2d at 513.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 409-29 (1965); see also 2 HARPER
& JAMES, TORTS § 26.11 (1956).
54. Each of those categories has numerous exceptions within the group; none-
theless they are generally categorized within this broad classification.
55. This involves the landowner-contractee's active negligence in such areas
as: (a) negligently selecting an independent contractor-see Associated Engineers v.
Job, 370 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1966); Hunt v. McNamee, 141 F. 293 (4th Cir. 1905);
Ellis & Lewis v. Warner, 180 Ark. 53, 20 S.W.2d 320 (1929); Mullich v. Brocker,
119 Mo. App. 332, 97 S.W. 549 (1905); Fox v. Ireland, 46 App. Div. 541, 61 N.Y.S.
1061 (1900); Jolly Motor Livery Corp. v. Allenberg, 188 Tenn. 452, 221 S.W.2d
513 (1949); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 411 (1965); (b) providing de-
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non-delegable duty of the employer; 6 and (3) respondeat superior."
The term "nondelegable duty" is the basic concept underlying
the entire catalogue of exceptions to the rule of employer immunity.
Whether the reason for prohibiting the delegation is the inherently
hazardous nature of the activity or the broader application of a stat-
utory duty or some special status between the employer and the in-
jured person, liability is imposed because the duty of care which the
employer had was one which could not be delegated or contracted
away. This principle has been generally adopted in the Restatement
of Torts:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should
recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to
others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take
fective equipment-see Brady v. Joy, 111 La. 1071, 36 So. 132 (1904); Johnson v.
J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 193 Mo. App. 198, 182 S.W. 1089 (1916); Mack v.
Marshall Field & Co., 218 N.C. 697, 12 S.E.2d 235 (1940); Peters v. Carolina Cot-
ton & Woolen Mills Inc., 199 N.C. 753, 155 S.E. 867 (1930); Paderick v. Golds-
boro Lumber Co., 190 N.C. 308, 130 S.E. 29 (1928); Kuhn v. P.J. Carlin Const.
Co., 145 Misc. 892, 278 N.Y.S. 635 (1935); (c) negligently giving ambiguous in-
structions pursuant to the work-see Starr v. Standard Tilton Milling Co., 183 Ill.
App. 454 (1913); Board of County Comm'rs v. Vickers, 62 Kan. 25, 61 P. 391
(1900); State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n v. Diamond Transp. Corp., 226 N.C.
371, 38 S.E.2d 214 (1946); Besner v. Central Trust Co., 230 N.Y. 350, 130 N.E.
577 (1921); and (d) negligent failure to exercise control retained by principal over
the work see Quinones v. Township of Upper Moreland, 293 F.2d 237 (3rd Cir.
1961); Spinozzi v. E. J. Lavino & Co., 243 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1957); Giar-
ratano v. The Weitz Co. Inc., 259 Iowa 1292, 147 N.W.2d 824 (1967); Bissel v.
Ford, 176 Mich. 64, 141 N.W. 860 (1913); Berquist v. Penterman, 46 N.J. Super.
74, 134 A.2d 20 (1957); Allen v. Texas Electric Service Co., 350 S.W.2d 866
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
56. This group concerns those non-delegable duties imposed by statute; e.g.,
Hess v. United States, 282 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1960); Schmid v. United States, 273
F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1959) (an excellent example of non-delegable duty under a
scaffolding act); Snyder v. Southern California Edison Co., 44 Cal. 793, 285 P.2d
912 (1955); John Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fire Proofing Co., 310 I1. 331,
141 N.E. 739 (1923); Ferguson v. Ashkenazy, 307 Mass. 197, 29 N.E.2d 828
(1940) (landlord-tenant relationship to provide safe premises); Blancher v. Bank
of California, 47 Wash. 2d 1, 286 P.2d 92 (1955) (to keep premises safe for busi-
ness invitees); Davis v. Summerfield, 133 N.C. 325, 45 S.E. 654 (1903) (afford
support to adjacent property owners); Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra note 4;
Watkins v. Gabriel Steel Co., 260 Mich. 692, 245 N.W. 101 (1932); Janice v. State,
201 Misc. 920, 107 N.Y. Supp. 2d 679 (1952); United States v. Pierce, 235 F.2d 466
(6th Cir. 1956); McDonald v. City of Oakland, 63 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1967).
57. If the liability is non-delegable, then liability may also be vicarious, and the
architect, general contractor, and subcontractors are all agents in carrying out non-
delegable duties. The principal is therefore vicariously liable on a respondeat su-
perior theory. See the cogent discussion of this responsibility in McDonald v.
City of Oakland, supra note 4, at 597, 598.
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such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in
the contract or otherwise. ... 58
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger
to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or
normal to the work, of which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when
making the contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others
by the contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger.5 9
Liability for breach of a non-delegable duty arises out of the na-
ture of the activity which the employer of the independent con-
tractor or the landowner has initiated. Because the activity is in-
herently hazardous, the employer or landowner must see to it that
the necessary precautions are taken to prevent injury. If he does
not see to it himself, he has not exercised due care. He may entrust
the duty to a competent contractor; but if the contractor does not
exercise due care, it is the duty of the employer or landowner to do
so. This rule was expressed by a New York court thusly:
To this rule however, there is a distinct and well-grounded exception. If the char-
acter of the work creates the danger or injury remains, then the owner of the prop-
erty who made the contract remains liable to persons who are injured by a failure
to properly guard or protect the work, even though the same in its entirety is en-
trusted to a competent independent contractor.6 0
Later the rule was interpreted in this manner:
Where one owes a duty to another, he cannot acquit himself of liability by dele-
gating performance of the duty to an independent contractor. . . . The Christman
Company was principal contractor for the erection of the building on the premises
in question, and cannot evade liability by the mere fact it hired Gohr to do ex-
cavating with a steam shovel. It was bound to see that the excavating, which as a
part of its contract it was bound to do, was not done by a subcontractor in a negli-
gent manner.6 1
The rule states, in effect, that he who creates an inherently hazard-
ous situation, be he landowner or general contractor, owes to those
endangered by that situation the utmost vigilance to protect them
from the inherent hazards. That requirement of vigilance is placed,
first and foremost, upon that person who initiates the hazard. In
effect, the negligence of the independent contractor provides the
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 (1965). Prosser states that
"these exceptions making the employer liable overlap and shade into one another;
and cases are comparatively rare in which at least two of them do not appear."
PROSSER, TORTS § 70, at 481 (3d ed. 1964).
60. Murphy v. Perlstein, 76 N.Y.S. 657, 659 (1902) (emphasis added).
61. Wright v. H.G. Christman Co., 244 Mich. 208, 215, 221 N.W. 314, 317
(1928) (emphasis added).
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plaintiff with a theory of recovery additional to or alternative with
that of the personal fault of the employer. A recent North Carolina
decision sets out the essential rationale of holding the employer liable
for the contractor's fault. In Dockery v. World of Mirth Shows, Inc., 2
the employer failed to inspect and supervise the operation of the ride.
The court stated that the liability of such owner or general con-
cessionaire is predicated either upon his nondelegable duty to main-
tain a reasonably safe place for the patrons, in accord with which he
must answer for the negligence of the sub-concessionaire-in ren-
dering the premises and devices unsafe-or merely upon the general
ground that such owner or general concessionaire is responsible for
his breach of duty to keep the premises, including the devices, rea-
sonably safe, without reference to any separate act or omission of the
sub-concessionaire."
The liability arising out of the breach of a non-delegable duty is
not absolute. In order for there to be liability, an act of negligence-
lack of due care-must have occurred. Section 427 of the Restate-
ment clearly requires a failure to take reasonable precautions as a
prerequisite to liability. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals exam-
ined these issues at length in Schmid v. United States:14
The duty of compliance of an owner of property being repaired or constructed by
an independent contractor, designated as "independent" and "nondelegable" by the
Illinois Supreme Court does not create absolute liability or render the owner an in-
surer. The statute creates a standard of care for the persons therein designated:
namely, the obligation that all scaffolds shall be erected in a "safe, suitable and
proper manner". Any owner who knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care could
have known that the scaffold was not erected in such a manner becomes liable for
noncompliance with the duty placed upon him by the terms of the Scaffold Act.
The owner's liability is predicated on his failure of compliance, not on any negli-
gence of an independent contractor.65
Another case following this rationale was Pierce v. United States',
wherein it was shown that the United States contracted with an
independent contractor to perform certain alterations to the elec-
trical plant on United States premises. The contractor negligently
62. 264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d 29 (1965).
63. Id. at 411, 142 S.E.2d at 33 (emphasis added).
64. 273 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1959).
65. Id. at 176; see also American Exchange Bank of Madison, Wisc. v. United
States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958), and Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314
(1960).
66. 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
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planned and coordinated its work. The plaintiff alleged that the
United States owed to him a non-delegable duty; an allegation with
which the court agreed. The court found that precautions which
would have prevented plaintiff's injuries could have been taken by
the defendant but were not. The defendant interposed the de-
fense that the breach of a non-delegable duty was not a negligent or
wrongful action or omission as envisaged under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. To this defense, the court responded as follows:
As the doctrine of nondelegable duty is applied in this state it is not a rule of strict
liability regardless of fault. Negligence is required, the sole effect of the doctrine
being to preclude the owner-employer from escaping liability for negligence which
was a proximate cause of injury on the ground that others may have been guilty of
negligence, which was also a proximate cause of injury. . . . Therefore, if the Act
requires negligence, the Tennessee cases are in complete conformity with the re-
quirement, liability being imposed upon proof of failure to exercise due care.0 7
The view, persuasively argued in Pierce, is that when the danger is
great, the care owed is proportionately great and may not be dele-
gated. For this reason, the liability is neither absolute nor neces-
sarily vicarious.
In recent years the United States Supreme Court has decided two
leading cases involving suits by employees of contractors against
owners: Hess v. United States," in which there was recovery after
remand to the lower court, the Court having found that the United
States could be liable as owner-under Maritime law, Oregon law
and Federal Tort Claims law-to the employee of an independent
contractor on a non-delegable duty theory; and Halecki v. United
New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Association,9 which
allowed a suit against a shipyard owner under New Jersey law by
an employee of a subcontractor because the owner did not take the
special precautions required when there is a recognized hazard.
While the principal may not delegate the duties, he can require,
by contract of indemnity, that he be held harmless in the event of
injury because of violation of a duty by both himself and the con-
tractor. In other words, the principal can delegate the task but this
67. Id. at 734. There is an excellent annotation on the subject of construction
site liability and particularly the duty of owners to contractor employees by a leading
tort writer, Dean Lambert, in Comments on Recent Important Personal Injury (Tort)
Cases, 29 NACCA L. J. 46, 82 (1962-63).
68. 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
69. 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
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act does not free the principal from the legal duty to third persons.
There are, however, inroads being made upon this possible indem-
nity. A recently enacted Michigan statute7° has declared it to be
against public policy for one to enforce an indemnity agreement
whereby one is held harmless for his own negligence.
Construction is inherently hazardous work; that is, work which if
negligently done could cause serious injury or death. There is an
obvious difference between entrusting to a contractor work which,
if properly done, will occasion no injurious circumstances and com-
mitting to him work from which mischievous consequences will arise
unless preventive measures are adopted. While it may be just, in
the former case, to hold the party authorizing the work free from
liability for negligence which he had no reason to anticipate, there is,
on the other hand, good ground for holding him liable for injury
caused by an act certain to be attended with injurious consequences,
if such consequences are not in fact prevented notwithstanding whose
default occasioned the omission to take the necessary measures for
such prevention.
Inherently hazardous activity has been characterized by the Re-
statement as follows:
The rule stated in this Section is commonly expressed by the courts in terms of lia-
bility of the employer for negligence of the contractor in doing work which is
"inherently" or "intrinsically" dangerous. It is not, however, necessary to the em-
ployer's liability that the work be of a kind which involves a high degree of risk of
such harm, or that the risk be one of very serious harm, such as death or serious
bodily injury. It is not necessary that the work call for any special skill or care
in doing it. It is sufficient that work of any kind involves a risk, recognizable in
advance, of physical harm to others which is inherent in the work itself, or normally
to be expected in the ordinary course of the usual or prescribed way of doing it, or
that the employer has special reason to contemplate such a risk under the par-
ticular circumstances under which the work is to be done.7 1
Clearly, whether an activity is inherently hazardous is a factual ques-
tion, subject to proof.72  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently examined this question and answered:
The question of what type of work is considered inherently dangerous is not always
readily soluble. Our research indicates that courts have found no rule of universal
application by which they may abstractly draw a line of classification. At least one
court has said: "Generally speaking, the proper test is whether danger 'inheres' in
70. MICH. STAT. ANN. ch. 265, § 26.1146(1) (Supp. 1969).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427, comment b (1965).
72. See Ross v. Heitner, 156 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1963).
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performance of the work, and important factors to be understood and considered are
the contemplated conditions under which the work is to be done and the known cir-
cumstances attending it. It is not enough that it may possibly produce injury.
Stated another way, intrinsic danger in an undertaking is one which inheres in the
performance of the contract and results directly from the work to be done-not from
the collateral negligence of the contractor."
In North Dakota, the question whether the undertaking is inherently dangerous is
primarily a fact question for the jury to determine. Taute v. J.I. Case Threshing
Machine Co., supra, 141 N.W. at 136. Judge Register submitted the issue by an
instruction which properly included all the facets of the doctrine. The jury was
told that "inherently or intrinsically dangerous means that an element of danger
exists in the performance of the contract resulting directly from the work to be
done, and not from the negligence of the party actually performing the work ....
The construction of the bridge involved extremely heavy steel girders and the use of
machines and men working at a height of 18 to 20 feet, to name only a few factors.
A witness for appellee who had been a structural engineer for the North Dakota
State Highway Department, stated unequivocally that the construction was inherently
dangerous and hazardous. We conclude that the evidence warranted submission of
the issue to the jury.78
Even by having an activity performed by an "independent con-
tractor," a person cannot avoid responsibility when the activity in-
volves unreasonable risk of harm to others. 4 One recent expression
of the California Supreme Court's attitude on the inherently danger-
ous activities rule appears in Ferrel v. Safway Steel Scaffolds,75 in
which the court held that there was sufficient evidence to bring the
owner within the ambit of the rule and that, although the evidence
indicated that the owner was unaware of the dangers involved, such
evidence was insufficient to absolve the owner as a matter of law.
This decision was based on the theory of Section 413, comment (b)
of the Restatement of Torts.
Prior to Ferrel, the concept of "independent contractor" furnished
a fair amount of protection to owners and general contractors, who
were allowed to have sufficient contacts to give knowledge of con-
ditions on the jobsite without being labeled as invitors. Under the
inherently dangerous activities rule, as expanded by Ferrel, the
owner or general contractor who retains sufficient overall control
73. Schultz & Lindsay Construction Co. v. Erickson, 352 F.2d 425, 436 (8th
Cir. 1965).
74. See PROSSER, supra note 59, at 484-86; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 413 (1965); see also, Vanoy v. City of Warren, 15 Mich. App. 158 (1969).
75. 57 Cal. 2d 651, 21 Cal. Rptr. 575, 371 P.2d 311 (1963). See also Mac-
Donald v. City of Oakland, supra note 4, and Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, supra
note 4.
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and contacts must nevertheless assume responsibility for minimiz-
ing risks in the manner of performance.7"
Personal Negligence of Principal
The law regarding a principal's personal negligence is stated suc-
cinctly in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 414:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of
any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose
safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by
his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
In a situation where any control remains in the contractee, Quin-
ones v. Township of Upper Moreland is applicable.7 7  In that case,
the defendant claimed that it retained no control over the work. The
contract entrusted the entire sewer project involved to an independ-
ent contractor, McCabe. The Third Circuit said:
ElIt was wholly within McCabe's power to hire, fire, control and supervise its em-
ployees; the contract specifically provided that shoring of trenches was to be per-
76. See Brooks, Tort Liability of Owners and General Contractors for On-The-
Job Injuries to Workmen, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 99, 115 (1965).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (1965): "One who employs an inde-
pendent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to
create, during its progress, a peculiarly unreasonable risk of physical harm to others
unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
them by the absence of such precautions if the employer: (a) fails to provide in the
contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or (b) fails to exercise
reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such precautions."
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965): "One who employs
an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as
likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm caused to them
by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions,
even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or
otherwise."
The apparent inconsistency is cleared up by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 416 comment c, which permits indemnity but does not relieve liability: "Section 413
states the liability of one who employs an independent contractor to do such work
and does not provide in the contract that the contractor shall take the precautions
necessary to make its progress safe. This Section deals with the liability of one
who employs a contractor to do such work, even though he stipulates in his contract
or in a contract with another independent contractor that the precautions shall be
taken, for bodily harm caused by the negligent failure of either contractor to take
such precautions. In such case the contractor who is employed to take the pre-
cautions is under a duty to indemnify his employer for any liability which the
contractor's negligence in failure to take reasonably adequate precautions may bring
upon him. However, the fact that the contract contains express stipulations for the
taking of adequate precautions and that the contractor agrees to assume all lia-
bility for harm caused by his failure to do so, does not relieve his employer from the
liability stated in this Section."
77. 293 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1961).
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formed in compliance with Pennsylvania Laws and regulations; the work was to be
performed in accordance with the specifications set forth in the contract and Town-
ship's "Engineers" (Harris, Henry & Potter, Inc., an engineering firm) was author-
ized to insure compliance by McCabe with the specifications and "to decide all
questions which may arise with the Contractor relative to .. . the manner, per-
formance . .. and acceptable fulfillment of the contract on the part of the Con-
tractor."
With respect to the happening of the accident it is undisputed that the trench was
then about 25 feet deep and four or five feet wide; it was not shored as required
by the Pennsylvania statute and its pertinent regulations; decedent was operating a
drill at the bottom of the trench when its walls collapsed and a large quanity of dirt
buried him; he died almost instantly of suffocation and a skull fracture, and the
absence of shoring was the proximate cause of decedent's injuries and death.7 8
Dean Prosser suggests that: "So far as he .. . retains any control
over any part of the work . . . he must likewise interfere to put a stop
to unnecessarily dangerous practices.""
An employer of an independent contractor owes a duty to third
persons to employ a competent and careful contractor."s This duty
exists not merely as to the initial selection, but also as to a continuous
determination that the contractor is doing his work in a careful and
competent manner. The more hazardous the job, the greater the
duty of continuing surveillance.
Certain factors are important: (I) the danger to which others will be exposed if the
contractor's work is not properly done; (2) the character of the work to be done-
whether the work lies within the competence of the average man or is work which
can be properly done only by persons possessing special skills and training; and (3)
the existence of a relation between the parties which imposes upon the one a peculiar
duty of protecting the other .... So too, a master owes to his servant not only the
duty to exercise care in the selection of a contractor to whom he entrusts the
preparation of a safe working place and appliances but also, as stated in Section 412,
Comment (e), a duty to inspect the working place and appliances in order to dis-
cover whether the contractor's work has been properly done.8 1
78. Id. at 240.
79. PROSSER, TORTS 368 (2d ed. 1955). See also Parsons v. Blount Bros. Const.
Co., 281 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1960).
80. Associated Engineers, Inc. v. Job, supra note 4. The same rule is more
particularly delineated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1965):
"An employer is subject to liability for physical harm to third persons caused by
his failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful con-
tractor (a) to do work which will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is skill-
fully and carefully done, or (b) to perform any duty which the employer owes to
third persons."
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 412, comment c (1965). See Hooey v.
Airport Construction Co., 253 N.Y. 486 (1930); Caspersen v. LaSala Brothers, 253
N.Y. 491 (1930); Kuhn v. Carlin Construction Co., Inc., 154 Misc. 892 (N.Y.
1935) (particularly the extended discussion concerning the duty of one who knows or
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Inadequacies of Restatement
Lawyers and judges are busy people. They seek quick solutions
to complex legal problems. Since the Restatement is a distillation
of the law from fifty-one different jurisdictions, with half of the states
granting statutory immunity to principals, it has been extremely diffi-
cult for the Restatement Committee to state the law definitively.
The inability or the unwillingness of the bar to read the Restatement
in historical context, conceptually rather than mechanically, and to
understand the statutory limitations on a general statement, has re-
sulted in the following limitations: (1) The Restatement is thought
to state a "general rule" of immunity when it no longer serves a
useful purpose and in fact constitutes a legal license to kill; (2) the
Restatement, read mechanically, defines in the late twentieth cen-
tury, a scientifically outmoded concept that suggests that standards
of prudent conduct can be set forth long in advance and amount to
propositions of law;82 and (3) the Restatement fails to define "third
persons" to include employees when that protection is absolutely
essential to a moral society. "
CONSTRUCTION SAFETY-PROBLEMS NOT TACKLED
There are seven basic reasons why construction safety has not be-
come an integral part of our legal framework and all are attributable
to an inadequate social policy."4
First, the owners who are undertaking construction enjoy both
the advantage of a cheap bid and immunity from liability in too
many jurisdictions. The contractors who recognize the need to use
nets, trench shoring, safe personnel hoists, etc., are faced with a
in the exercise of due care should know that his contractor is using unsafe equip-
ment or improper methods).
82. See Bishop v. N.Y. Central R.R., 348 Mich. 345, 83 N.W.2d 278 (1957)
wherein the court warns against postulating such rules in advance. See also James,
The Qualities of the Reasonable Man In Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1951).
83. For an example of the resultant confusion see the horrendous example of a
legal license to kill given by the court in Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288, 466-
67 (2nd Cir. 1966). At the same time the Second Circuit, interpreting New York
law, was denying recovery to a project employee because of workmen's compensation
contribution by the principal, the New York Court of Appeals in Belt v. Port of
Authority of N.Y., 19 N.Y.2d 850 (1967), was approving recovery to a project em-
ployee despite workmen's compensation contribution by the principal.
84. See Address by Harry M. Philo, What's Wrong with Construction Safety In
The United States, National Safety Congress, October 23, 1967.
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choice of computing their costs as part of the bid price and losing
the bid, or not computing them in the bid and therefore being hand-
cuffed in their use and winning the bid. Death's handyman is the
victor.
Second, in every construction bid, all aspects of safety are pre-
sumably part of the bid price rather than major safety items being
paid for on a cost-plus basis above the bid price.
Third, "hold-harmless" agreements, which are contrary to public
policy, encourage negligent performance and should be outlawed
everywhere.
Fourth, most construction contract specification writers are totally
incompetent to write the safety specifications of the contract. No
architectural and engineering firm in the country employs a con-
struction safety engineer. It requires great arrogance for these
specification writers and architectural superintendents to write or
supervise safety specifications with their level of safety sophistication.
No contractor can or should be held to job tolerances in the area of
safety performance that are not part of the specifications upon which
the bid price was calculated.
Fifth, the construction industry has not begun to adopt the safety
standards, codes and safe practices which are required in the exercise
of due care.
Sixth, there have been no major efforts to replace totally inade-
quate construction equipment, which remains unguarded, not inter-
locked or fail-safed, with poor lateral acceleration capability.
Seventh, salaries for construction safety men are unrealistic and
totally inadequate. The safety man is often the lowest paid em-
ployee on the project. Underpaid safety personnel are perfectly
capable of telling workers to "be careful" and to wear their unsafe
helmets and also capable of performing their role in ridiculous safety
awards programs. But they are incapable of recognizing major job
hazards and of establishing the safety programs necessary to prevent
serious injury or death.
WHY THE PRESENT SITUATION EXISTS
LACK OF APPRECIATION OF THE SOCIAL PURPOSE OF TORT LAW
The conflict existing in the field. of torts which was present when
[Vol. XIX:I1
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Justice Talbot Smith was writing Collateral Negligence", in 1941-
namely, the conflict whether principles of fault or social consider-
ations should govern the employer's tort liability-still exists today.
The development of ergonomics, biotechnology and safety engineer-
ing, however, make it mandatory that the social purpose of the tort
law be accident prevention; only when the law fails in achieving
its primary social purpose should compensation for the victim be
weighed against other conflicting principles. Both Prosser"6 and
Seavey" take the position that the function of the law of torts is
directed toward the compensation of individuals for harm which they
have suffered.
There are two basic interests which come into conflict in the area
of tort law: The security interest of the individual plaintiff against
damage and the defendant's claim to freedom of action. Generally,
the former requires compensation irrespective of fault and the latter
requires compensation only when intentional harm or undue lack of
care is shown. The primitive law sought security. The eighteenth cen-
tury stressed economic movement and freedom of action. Toward
the end of the ninteenth century a balance was attempted which fos-
tered the development of the rationale that one who engages in activ-
ity and employs or controls others should be liable for the harm
caused by his activities, agencies or things, and conversely, non-
wrongful conduct shielded the actor from liability."8 Tort law in
the late twentieth century has begun to recognize that accident
prevention must be preceded by liability.
Be the exceptions more or less numerous, the general purpose of the law of torts is to
secure a man indemnity against certain forms of harm to person, reputation or
estate, at the hands of his neighbors, not because they are wrong, but because they
are harms. The true explanation of the reference of liability to a moral standard, in
the sense which has been explained, is not that it is for the purpose of improving
85. See the excellent collection of background articles contained in Smith,
Collateral Negligence, 25 MINN. L. REv. 399 n.2 (1941).
86. PROSSER, TORTS 56 (3d ed. 1964) citing Wright, Introduction to the Law of
Torts, 8 CAbB. L. J. 238 (1944) where it is stated that with: "the various and ever-
increasing clashes of the activities of persons living in a common society, carrying
on business in competition with fellow members of that society . . . there must of
necessity be losses, or injuries of many kinds sustained as a result of the activities of
others. The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust these losses and to afford com-
pensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of an-
other." Id. at 238.
87. Seavey, Principles of Tort, 56 HAv. L. REv. 72 (1942).
88. Id. at 73-74.
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men's hearts, but that it is to give a man a fair chance to avoid doing the harm
tbefore he is held responsible for it. It is intended to reconcile the policy of letting
accidents lie where they fall, and the reasonable freedom of others with the protec-
tion of the individual from injury. . . . As the law, on the one hand, allows cer-
tain harms to be inflicted irrespective of the moral condition of him who inflicts
them, so, at the other extreme, it may on grounds of policy throw the absolute risk
of certain transactions on the person engaging in them, irrespective of blame-
worthiness in any sense.8 9
Not only has there been a failure to recognize the social function
of tort law, but the development of a technologically complicated
society has made new demands upon the old tort doctrine. These
demands necessitate a new fabric. Harlan F. Stone characterized
the situation in these terms:
In the brief space of about seventy years our law has been called upon to accommo-
date itself to changes of conditions, social and economic, more marked and extensive
in their creation of new interests requiring legal protection and control, than occurred
in the three centuries which followed the discovery of America. Rapid social
change, more than all else, puts to the test a legal system which seeks its inspiration
and its guidance in a past which could make no adequate prophecy of the future.90
The failure is attributable in part to changing economic conditions
and the need to adapt. Fleming James has described the situ-
ation and indicated its import in the formulation of theories of tort
liability:
[Als scientific knowledge advances, more risks can be discovered and avoided. Those
who deal with matters affected by these advances must keep reasonably abreast of
them. What is excusable ignorance today may be negligence tomorrow. As tech-
niques for detecting accident proneness become perfected, employers will have to
take account of them so as to remove accident prone employees from posts of danger.
Perception of the risk is the sum of all that has heretofore been dealt with in this
section. It is the correlation of past experience with the specific facts in a situation.
If a reasonable man with the actor's own knowledge and experience plus the knowl-
edge and experience with which he is charged would perceive a risk in the conduct
in question the actor will be held to perceiving that risk. The courts, of course,
set the outer boundary to what a man may reasonably be held to foresee. But a
judgment upon this question, in the nature of things, may be exercised within wide
limits, and this is one of the focal points where the concept of negligence is being
expanded. Not only have the scientific advances noted above enlarged the scope of
what a jury may find to be foreseeable, but a quickening social conscience and
the general trend towards wider liability have led the courts to perceive risks in ordi-
nary activities of men where not so long ago they ruled them out of the permis-
sible range of what might be found.91
89. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 144-45 (1881) (emphasis added).
90. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REV. 4, 11
(1936).
91. James, supra note 82, at 13, 14.
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A SAFETY UNCONSCIOUS SOCIETY
Generally
There are approximately 110,000 accidental deaths and more than
10 million disabling injuries in the United States annually. 92  This
is a sad indictment of a legal system charged with minimizing the
harms and conflicts between people and things. The recent auto
safety controversy has made the legal profession aware of the lack of
attention which has been given to safety engineering. The injury
and severity rates are higher in construction than for the same ex-
posure in motor vehicle travel. In September, 1899, the first re-
corded death by automobile occurred in the United States. It wasn't
until 1,250,000 lives had been lost that a congressional committee
began considering a study into the causes of such a large casualty
rate. The lack of appreciation for safety in this area as well as
others was expressed by one congressman:
I am getting tired of introducing bills and holding hearings on safety matters. This
is certainly not a far reaching bill. But it is a bill that can save a lot of lives. And
when the Department continually comes up here and recommends against a very
small step in the direction of the safety of our people on the highways, roads, and
streets of this country, it seems to me that certainly we ought to investigate and
find out what is wrong with the Department of Commerce. . . They constantly
opposed every effort the Congress made for safety in that field. I am not going to
be satisfied until we find out what is happening at the Department level.
9 3
Fifteen years ago the board of directors of any American corpora-
tion that allocated any substantial sum for accident prevention, ex-
cept for prevention of injuries to their own employees, was not
maximizing profits in accord with their responsibility to their stock-
holders; a secure position, since there was negligible liability for
negligent performance.
Because lawyers, judges, legislatures and tort writers were slow
in developing liability, the slogans "Drive Safely," "Operate Your
Machine Safely," "Be Careful," etc., became not only the safety slo-
gans, but also the safety philosophy of the nation. The idea that
accidental injury is always the individual's own fault was perpet-
uated and developed by a society placed in a strait jacket by the law.
This emphasis on individual responsibility did not develop as a
logical conclusion of a safety profession which, unfettered by re-
92. NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, ANNUAL ACCIDENT FACTS.
93. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 299-300 (1965).
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strictions, had researched, investigated, studied, catalogued and
analyzed injury statistics objectively. The emphasis resulted from
the legal strait jackets placed upon the safety profession by the law.
Unable, because of immunity, privity, jurisdictional limitations, no-
tice requirements, etc., to formulate correct principles of safety en-
gineering they were forced to turn to safe practices. 4
Construction Specifically
The statistics at the beginning of this article are testimony to the
lack of safety in construction." Four vignettes will assist the reader
in understanding what is wrong with construction safety.
About ten years ago, the top safety engineer for the United States
Coast Guard wrote to the Coast Guard commandant and heads of
Civil and Naval Engineering that due care required specific safety
rules in bid specifications. The written response was that it would
be too expensive and would limit their ability to get contractors,
since contractors would not want to be so regulated or would insist
upon more money if they were compelled to perform safely."6
On February 24, 1967, the man in charge of all major construc-
tion for the Ford Motor Company testified in a federal court matter
that, in his opinion, it was not necessary to cover a floor hole ad-
jacent to a pallet of bricks and under which employees of con-
tractors were expected to work. 7
On July 27, 1967, the assistant director of safety for General
Motors testified that upon being subpoenaed to bring the A.S.A.
Safety Code For Building Construction and A.S.A. Code For Cranes,
Derricks and Hoists and Accident Prevention Manual in Construc-
tion that he was unable to find them and, as far as he knew, General
Motors never had them.9"
General Motors' engineers testified that their legal department had,
94. See Human Factors Engineering-What Research Found for Safetymen in
Pandora's Box, NAT'L Safety News (August 1968).
95. See also the published proceedings of the first Associated General Con-
tractors National Safety Conference (1968).
96. See testimony of Fred Bisel, Gowdy v. United States, supra note 8.
97. See testimony of Thomas Dunlop, Gaston v. Ford Motor Co., No. 25772 Fed-
eral District Court Eastern District of Michigan.
98. See testimony of Benj. J. Cieslik, McDonough v. General Motors, Genessee
County Mich., Cir. Court No. 4074.
[Vol. XIX: 1
LICENSE TO KILL CONSTRUCTION WORKERS
fifteen years before, written safety specifications for a construction
contract, and that General Motors employed architectural firms to
custom-fit the safety specifications to the contract. However, the
architects were incapable of writing the safety specifications because
of lack of expertise. 9
Such testimony has caused the Associated General Contractors to
hold its first safety conference in February of 1968.100 It is par-
ticularly significant that at this first national safety conference in this
organization's fifty year history, the implicit theme was one of head-
ing off adoption of federal construction safety legislation. Fewer
than one hundred of the 8,200 general contractors who are members
cared enough about safety to have any representative present, and the
overwhelming majority of the top four hundred firms, who do bil-
lions of dollars of construction annually, were conspicuous by their
absence. Few of these firms employ trained safety engineers with
duties solely related to safety.
Lack of safety in construction has caused the Construction Section
of the National Safety Council to send an article entitled "Construc-
tion Safety and Legal Liability" to its members'' and invite an
officer of the American Trial Lawyers to address its congress on
"What's Wrong With Construction Safety in the United States?"' 0 It
has resulted, in many states, in the first national "Construction Safety
Day" in history. It has precipitated many articles on the cost of
liability in the trade journals.' It has caused many construction
companies to hire safety engineers and adopt safety programs. The
engineering profession has begun to examine the adequacy of its con-
tract safety specifications. 1 4
Safety sophistication is relatively new in the construction safety
field also. It has only been in the last twenty years that reasonably
prudent owners formulated and controlled all aspects of contractor
safety. It is not surprising that few courts have had trial records
99. See testimony of William DeGrow Jr., McDonough v. General Motors, Id.
100. For report data see supra note 95.
101. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, CONSTRUCTION SAFETY AND LEGAL LIABILITY
(1967).
102. See Address of Harry M. Philo, supra note 84.
103. Baxter, Make It Sale or Be Sued, ThE IRON AGE 46 (1966).
104. See Latham, It's Time To Re-Evaluate Our Safety Effort, CONSTRUCTOR
34 (1967).
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which would present factual proof of reasonably foreseeable risk to
assist the courts in fulfilling their role as social architects in the field
of accident prevention. 0 5 There has been a widespread recognition
by owners and contractors that construction safety can be achieved
only by strict owner supervision in every sense.1 '6
The large injury and death tolls have also caused a continuing
controversy regarding "hold harmless" clauses in various parts of the
country. This has generated legislative action in the form of stat-
utes which render unenforceable clauses in construction contracts
holding a contractor liable for damages arising out of injury to per-
sons or damage to property that is the consequence of the negligence
of the owner, his employees, or his agents.10 7  The new law in
Michigan declares as being against public policy, therefore void and
unenforceable,
a covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or in connection with or col-
lateral to, a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair or
maintenance of a building, structure, appurtenance and appliance, including moving,
demolition and excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify the prom-
isee against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to
property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee, or in-
demnitee, his agents or employees. 1 0 8
There is one aspect of construction safety that magnifies a problem
acutely peculiar to the industry. In almost all major industries, the
bulk of the work is done by established firms who have industrial
safety programs and who long ago realized that safety pays. Ac-
cordingly, such firms have made serious attempts at achieving low
injury frequency and severity rates. This is not true in the con-
struction industry however. There are approximately 700,000 con-
tracting firms in construction, and few have adequate safety pro-
grams, trained personnel, or reasonably safe tools and equipment.
"Probably the most common cause for controversies on the matter
of job tolerances results from a contractor using poor construction
equipment or unskilled labor with which the desired accuracy cannot
105. See dissent in Douglas v. Edgewater Park, 369 Mich. 320, 332 (1963)
urging the court to adopt a rule which would prevent injury.
106. See Cummings, Job Safety Must Be Pre-Planned, ROADS AND STREETS 75
(1961) and McElroy, Specifying Safety in Construction Contracts, National Safety
News, April, 1965, at 20.
107. See Hold Harmless Disputes, Engineering News Record, August 18, 1966
at 71.
108. MICH. STAT. ANN., ch. 265, § 26.1146(1) (Supp. 1969).
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be produced."'" 9 The marginal companies cannot afford to have a
safety program, safe equipment, or trained personnel. They must
gamble and hope for few accidents. The law of averages is against
them. It is for this reason that the employers' workmen's compen-
sation liability does little or nothing for construction safety.
Against this backdrop is the attempt by federal agencies to for-
malize a comprehensive program designed to put a halt to the in-
action and penury in eliminating the carnage in the area of indus-
trial accidents. Thus far such efforts have been stifled by the repre-
sentatives of industry and commerce. The central issue is being
skirted since it is to the benefit of big business to block federal bills.
Former Secretary of Labor Wirtz told a Senate subcommittee on labor
that the facts indicate a need to act before our society is engulfed
in the growing industrial slaughter. In describing the main issue he
said:
It is whether the Congress is going to act to stop a carnage which continues for
one reason, and one reason only, and that is because the people in this country
don't realize what is involved, and they can't see the blood on the food that they eat,
and on the things that they buy, and on the services they get.1 1 0
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ELECTION STATUTES
A major impediment to the development of any meaningful law in
the area of principals employing contractors was the election require-
ments of workmen's compensation statutes. Between 1905 and 1955
a construction worker injured at work by the negligence of a third
party had to elect between the sure remedy of low workmen's com-
pensation benefits and the gamble of collecting on a possible judg-
ment rendered in a suit against the third party while being barred
by statute from the compensation remedy because of such election.
At the same time, legislatures felt it desirable to remain uninvolved
in the prevention of industrial accidents. 1 ' Since the law is what the
court will state in the next case when the precise issue is presented
with adequate evidence, properly briefed and argued, rather than
what it has said the last time, it is obvious that the absence of advo-
109. STUBBS, Owners Engineer, in HANDBOOK OF HEAVY CONSTRUCTION (1959).
110. See Nader and Gordon, Safety on the Job, NEW REPUBLIC, June 15, 1968,
at 23.
111. See Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 76 (1967).
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cacy, so necessary to the correct development of the law, has left
the law undeveloped and in a state of limbo until recently when the
election statutes were repealed.
COMMON LAW COUNTS
The early English common law pleadings have wreaked havoc
with the logical development of tort law. The requirement that a
pleading spell out conformance to a rule of a prior case has limited
and hampered understanding of the elements of a tort case.
The early English law did not construct a broad concept of lia-
bility, but was interested in procedural conformance. The courts
constructed and judicially developed a law of negligence that re-
quired an individual to adhere to and abide by a predetermined legal
duty. Thus negligence and duty became correlatives and required
the party injured to prove that a duty was owed and that the de-
defendant failed to live up to the standard as the facts of the plead-
ings spelled out. In time there developed a body of law which
declared that an individual would be responsible for the negligent
performance of his personal undertaking.
The questions "what is duty?" and "what are duties?" gave rise
to a great battleground with two mighty forces aligned on each side.
On one side the concept of due care-on the other the vested in-
terests, the sanctity of land championed by those who would limit
the recovery of the many from the few. Land, manufacturing, con-
struction, transportation have been owned by the few, and those
who desire denial of recovery to persons injured in their under-
takings have for more than one hundred years found judges willing to
give immunity in circumstances where popularly elected legislatures
were reluctant to grant such immunity from liability.
The courts have gone even further in thwarting justice in the
past. When "duty" was too obvious for directed verdicts, the bench
has proceeded to spell out duties."'
JUDICIAL CONFUSION OF THE CONCEPT OF DUTY
The concept of "duty" was wholly alien to Roman law and there
112. See Ackerberg v. Muskegon Osteopathic Hosp., 366 Mich. 596, 115 N.W.2d
290 (1962).
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is no trace of it in the modern Continental systems."' It may
well be asked: Does it serve any useful function at all?
When negligence began to develop as a separate basis of tort lia-
bility, the courts developed the idea of duty as a matter of some
specific relation between plaintiff and defendant without which
there could be no liability. The concept of duty was not in any way
related to the activity or tortious conduct of the actor. It was based
on a status relationship which is irrelevant in determining the actual
commission of a tort. The amorphous term "duty" was invoked by
the courts in order to insure the status quo. It served no useful pur-
pose and was productive only in creating confusion.
From 1837 to 1842, three English cases were decided which led
the judicial minds in later decades into the foggy realm of "duty." '114
A good example of how the duty concept clouded judicial reasoning
is found in Le Lievve v. Gould,"' decided in 1893. Lord Esher
declared:
The question of liability for negligence cannot arise at all until it is established that
the man who has been negligent owed some duty to the person who seeks to make
him liable for his negligence. . . . A man is entitled to be as negligent as he
pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to them. 1 1 6
This was a repudiation by Lord Esher of a concept of a general duty
of reasonable care formulated in Heaven v. Pender" and stated in
this manner:
Whenever any person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to
another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize
that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those
circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the
other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.118
)7he conceptual error persisted in England for another forty years
and was generalized by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson:"9
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure
113. See Buckland, The Duty to Take Care, 51 L. Q. REV. 637 (1939), for an
analysis of duty in Roman law, and PROSSER, TORTS 331 n.2 (3d ed. 1964).
114. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842);
Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837); Langridge v.
Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (1837).
115. 1 Q.B.D. 491 (1893).
116. Id. at 497.
117. Q.B.D. 503 (1883).
118. Id. at 509.
119. 1932 A.C. 562 (1932).
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your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a re-
stricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts and omissions which
you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then,
in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be-persons who are so closely and
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation
as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which
are called in question. 120
While the English judiciary was engulfing itself in a legal strait
jacket, the concept of duty minus the status relation had already been
formulated in one treatise: 121
Before the law every man is entitled to the enjoyment of unfettered freedom so long
as his conduct does not interfere with the equal liberty of all others. Where one
man's sphere of activity impinges on another man's, a conflict of interests arises.
The debatable land where these collisions may occur is taken possession of by the
law, which lays down the rules of mutual intercourse. A liberty of action which
is allowed therein is called a right, the obligation of restraint a duty, and the
terms are purely relative each implying the other. Duty, then, as a legal term indi-
cates the obligation to limit freedom of action and to conform to a prescribed
course of conduct. The widest generalization of duty is that each citizen "must do
no act to injure another."'1 22
The entire principle of subdividing or categorizing the duty of
reasonable care has come under much judicial scrutiny in recent
times. The courts have generally recognized that the practice of
delineating and isolating specific "exceptions" or situations in which
a duty is owed is an anachronism related directly to the old writs
and common counts which required factual conformance to the partic-
ular rule before permitting recovery. The courts have long recog-
nized that justice does not have any a priori relationship to the
specific counts, and have generally adopted an ad hoc stance in par-
ticular cases, using only the "reasonable care" standard for guid-
ance. The awareness of the narrow legalistic thinking was explicit
in these words of about a decade ago:
Care does not increase or diminish by calling it names. We think the abstract con-
cept of reasonable care is in itself quite difficult enough to grapple with and apply
in our law without our courts gratuitously conferring honorary degrees upon it.
There is only one degree of care in the law, and that is the standard of care
which may reasonably be required or expected under all the circumstances of a given
situation, whether arising in the manufacture of canned beans or cinder blocks.1 23
120. Id. at 580.
121. I. BEVEN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW (4th ed. 1928).
122. Id. at 7-8 cited in Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L.
REV. 41, 42, n.4 (1934).
123. See Spence v. Three Rivers Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
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The common law standard of care has been the same for centuries:
a duty of reasonable care under all circumstances. 124 The problems
confronting the judiciary in regard to this standard has been three-
fold.
First, they have failed to recognize that due care is sophisticated
knowledge. Believing it to be common sense, they have felt free
to express as a matter of law the care which they believe was the
limit of prudence required of the principal. They called this the
duty owed. Due care, however, is what a jury would consider to be
reasonable prudence after evidence of a standard of care rather
than a trial judge's nineteenth century concept of due care.
Second, with their limited and unsophisticated views of how rea-
sonably prudent owners obtain job safety, they have proceeded to limit
the category of persons to whom duty is owed to exclude even those
within the "zone of danger.' 125
Third, they have confused the law of owner-invitee with the law
of principal's employing contractors and thereby, in many instances,
attached the lesser rules of prudent behavior judicially approved for
the owner-invitee situation to the case involving an undertaking of a
principal.
The American conceptualization of duty took place in the cele-
brated case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. 126 In Palsgraf, plain-
tiff, a passenger standing on a station platform, was hurt by some
scales which fell down on her as the result of an explosion some dis-
tance away. The explosion was caused by fireworks dropped by
another passenger when an employee of defendant pushed him in
order to help him board a crowded train. Nothing about the appear-
ance of the package indicated its contents. The only negligence com-
plained of was this action by the employee in pushing the unknown
passenger. The court of appeals held that the defendant was not
liable. Judge Cardozo held that, since Mrs. Palsgraf was not within
the "zone of danger," there was no duty owed to her. He said:
The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the
package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Rela-
tive to her, it was not negligence at all. Nothing in the situation gave notice that
124. Goodman, A Safe Place to Live: Exploring Safety Standards and Codes in
the Cities, 44 J. URBAN L. 341, 342 (1967).
125. See Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288 (2nd Cir. 1966).
126. .248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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the falling package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus removed ...
If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and
harmless, at least to outward seeing, with reference to her, did not take to itself
the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong . . . with reference to some-
one else . . . . What the plaintiff must show is a wrong to herself.'
27
He reiterated the theory of the necessity for proving a status be-
tween the parties and that the wrong committed had to be reason-
ably perceived:
Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation. Negligence in the abstract, apart
from things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all ...
Negligence is not a tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong, and the com-
mission of a wrong imports the violation of a right, in this case, we are told, the
right to be protected against interference with one's bodily security. But bodily
security is protected, not against all forms of interference or aggression, but only
against some. One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action
by showing without more that there has been damage to his person. If the harm
was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger
so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it
though the harm was unintended.
We may assume, without deciding, that negligence, not at large or in the abstract,
but in relation to the plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all consequences,
however novel or extraordinary.1 28
This view presents the scope of "duty" as measured by the scope of
the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails. 2 '
The dissenting opinion of Judge Andrews attacked the majority's
view of the concept of duty. Negligence, he argued, is not dependent
upon a status between litigants. It is the commission of a wrong
which results in injury by the negligent conduct. His opinion stated
that there is a duty toward the entire world, without regard to any
particular existing relationship.' 0 The limitations upon the tort-
feasor's liability are whether the act was the proximate cause and
whether the act caused the specific injury complained of."3'
127. Id. at 341-43, 162 N.E. at 99-100.
128. Id. at 341-47, 162 N.E. at 99-102.
129. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardoza and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372
(1939), 48 YALE L.J. 390 (1939), 39 COLUM. L. REV. 20 (1939).
130. James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L.
REV. 95, 104 (1950).
131. "The result we shall reach depends upon our theory as to the nature of
negligence. Is it a relative concept-the breach of some duty owing to a particular
person or to particular persons? Or where there is an act which unreasonably
threatens the safety of others, is the doer liable for all its proximate consequences,
even where they result in injury to one who would generally be thought to be out-
side the radius of danger? . . .
"[I1n an empty world negligence would not exist. It does involve a relationship
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With characteristic insight, Professor James has described the ap-
proach taken by the dissent in Palsgraf as follows:
Under this rule it will be seen that the inquiry into the scope of duty is concerned
with exactly the same factors as is the inquiry into whether conduct is unreasonably
dangerous (i.e. negligent). Both seek to find what consequences of the challenged
conduct should have been foreseen by the actor who engaged in it. Neither inquiry
stops with what might be called the physical range of foreseeable harm, or with
mere proximity in time or space. In both we look to see what natural forces and
what human conduct should have appeared likely to come upon the scene, and we
weigh the dangerous consequences likely to flow from the challenged conduct in the
light of these interventions. And in this inquiry foreseeability is not to be
measured by what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely
enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful man would take
account of it in guiding practical conduct. Just as this broadening of the quest
adds to the risks which may make conduct unreasonably dangerous, just so does
it add to the range of duty.132
between man and his fellows. But not merely a relationship between man and
those whom he might reasonably expect his act would injure. Rather a relationship
between him and those whom he does in fact injure. If his act has a tendency to
harm some one, it harms him a mile away as surely as it does those on the
scene ....
"The proposition is this. Every one owes to the world at large, the duty of re-
fraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such
an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected
to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would gen-
erally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining
but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be
expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one
alone, but all those in fact injured may complain . . . Unreasonable risk being
taken, its consequences are not confined to those who might probably be hurt ...
"IBlut there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with the negli-
gence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former ...
What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of pub-
lic policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics ...
And here not, what the [defendant] had reason to believe would be the result of
his conduct, but what the prudent would foresee, may have a bearing ...
for the problem of proximate cause is not to be solved by any one contention."
Andrews, J. dissenting in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., supra note 126 at 347-54,
162 N.E. at 99. See also PROSSER, TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964): "The state-
ment that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question-whether the
plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct.
It is therefore not surprising to find that the problem of duty is as broad as the whole
law of negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has been formulated. It is a
shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself ....
[lilt should be recognized that 'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only as expression
of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection;" and 32 A.T.L.J. 177, 178 (1968) for
very cogent comments on this subject.
132. James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 778, 781-82
(1953).
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ABSENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in relevant part: "No state shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Equal protection
requires equal treatment under the law-nothing more, nothing less.
There has been no reported challenge to the immunity given to
principals by statute or in those few instances in which a court has
said the duty owed to everyone else is not owed to a project
employee. It appears, however, that it is arbitrary, illogical and un-
reasonable for either the legislature or a common law court to
classify a project employee, subjected to a possible risk of harm from
a principal, differently from all others subjected to the same possible
risk of harm when there is no benefit from such classification. Re-
cent decisions have struck down rules of law on the basis of equal
protection requirements. For example, the United States Supreme
Court in May, 1968, decided that it was a denial of equal protection
to give immunity to a tortfeasor causing the wrongful death of a
child born out of wedlock when no immunity was granted in a cause
of action brought by the mother of a so-called "legitimate" child.'" :
Whether or not one accepts the majority or minority viewpoint as
expressed in Palsgraf, a workman on the project is in the "zone of
danger" of the principal's failure to use care, and this probably
should be as a matter of law.""
In Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,",5
133. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
134. See Justice Smith's incisive discussion in Elbert v. City of Saginaw, 363
Mich. 463, 109 N.W.2d 879 (1961) on who, as a matter of law, is in the "zone of
danger." See also PROSSER, ToRTs §§ 394-95 (3d ed. 1964): "The leading English
case of Indermaur v. Dames laid down the rule that as to those who enter premises
upon business which concerns the occupier, and upon his invitation expressed or
implied, the latter is under an affirmative duty to protect them, not only against
dangers of which he knows, but also against those which with reasonable care he
might discover. The case has been accepted in all common law jurisdictions, and
the invitee, or as he is sometimes called the business visitor, is placed upon a higher
footing than a licensee. The typical example, of course, is the customer in a store.
Patrons of restaurants, banks, theatres, bathing beaches, fairs and other places of
amusement, and other business open to the public are included, as are drivers
calling for or delivering goods purchased or sold, independent contractors doing
work on the premises and the workmen employed by such contractors, as well as a
large and miscellaneous group of similar persons who are present in the interest of
the occupier as well as of their own." (emphasis added).
135. 175 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
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it was held that a state statute, which provided a comparative law
remedy in suits against railroads was unconstitutional; this ruling
was based on the observation that different legal treatment of rail-
roads was not constitutionally proper in view of the development of
competing modes of transportation.
Similarly in Grasse v. Dealers Transport Co.,1"6 a case before the
Illinois Supreme Court, it was held that the Illinois workmen's com-
pensation statute was partially invalid in that it provided injured em-
ployees with a common law right of action against third parties not
subject to the statute while transferring the cause to the employer
when the third party was covered by the act. The court held that
no ascertainable logic or policy supported the distinction; further,
that in order for such a distinction to prevail,
it must appear that the particular classification is based upon some real and sub-
stantial difference in kind, situation or circumstance in the persons or objects on
which the classification rests, and which bears a rational relation to the evil to be
remedied and the purpose to be attained by the statute, otherwise, the classification
will be deemed arbitrary and in violation of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and equal protection of the laws.
137
Several courts have had occasion, recently, to point out (although
not in a constitutional challenge) the lack of logic in treating project
employees differently from others.
In Woolen v. Aerojet General Corporation,8 the California Su-
preme Court noted:
[We have] held that employees of an independent contractor comes within the word
"others" as used in sections 413, 414 and 428 of the Restatement of Torts, which
like section 414 set forth rules relating to the liability of one hiring an independent
contractor (Citations omitted). There is no reason to hold otherwise with respect
to section 416.139.
Similarly, in Associated Engineers v. Job, 4' Judge Blackmun, in
writing an opinion of the court involving South Dakota law, indi-
cated that the duty imposed by Section 413 probably extends to an
136. 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).
137. Id. at 193-4, 106 N.E.2d at 132.
138. 57 Cal. 2d 407, 410, 369 P.2d 708, 711 (1962).
139. See Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508 (1968) in
which it was held that the duty imposed by statute was owed by a municipality to
an employee of an independent contractor. See also McDonald v. City of Oakland,
63 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1967); and Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo.
95, 6 S.W.2d 617 (1928).
140. 370 F.2d 633, 645 (8th Cir. 1966).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
employee of an independent contractor under the circumstances in-
volved there.
There is no more justification for giving a principal employing a
contractor immunity from liability to the project employee than there
was for giving the defendant immunity in Grasse.' In the opinion
of the writer there will be constitutional challenges to this alleged
immunity in every jurisdiction within the next decade.
STATING IT DOES NOT MAKE IT SO-FICTIONS THAT ARE USED
TO JUSTIFY IMMUNITY
Fictions, of course are not necessarily bad. The danger is that a court, after fre-
quent repetition, will begin to believe that they are real and thus employing them
reach inequitable results.14 2
RIGHT TO RELY ON CONTRACTOR
In the practicalities of life, there is no greater absurdity than the
statement that in construction the principal "can rely on the con-
tractor."' 43 In construction contract bids, the safety conscious con-
tractor who recognizes the need to use nets will not win the bid if he
adds $50,000 for nets and his competitor submits a price which has
been computed without nets. The contractor who figures a bid with
$30,000 for trench shoring loses to the competititor who plans to
do it in the unsafe way. The same is true for safe construction of
passenger elevators, for proper scaffolding, for guarded machinery,
even for the salary of a safety engineer. If the contractor chooses to
compete without figuring into the bid price the cost of safety items and
he wins the bid, he cannot then use the safety items and achieve a
profit.
It is well known that the construction field is highly competitive;
in order to offer a bid with a chance of acceptance, a contractor
must pare his expenses down to the bare minimum in order to arrive
at a favorable estimate. It is not feasible to narrow expenses in the
141. Supra note 136.
142. Lyshak v. City of Detroit, 351 Mich. 230, 244, 88 N.W.2d 596 (1958).
143. See Editors, Construction Safety, National Safety News, Sept. 1968; Speci-
fying Safety in Construction Contracts, National Safety News, April, 1965; duPont
Engineering Department, I & II CONSTRUCTION DIVISION SAFETY OPERATIONAL
METHODS; NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT PREVENTION MANUAL FOR INDUS-
TRIAL OPERATIONS § 14-1-14-57 (4th ed. 19 ); and supra note 95.
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quality of materials to be used, for these materials are required to
conform to a particular quality standard under contractual compul-
sion. The simplest, most effective means of cutting costs involves:
(1) use of cheap or old machinery; (2) use of specialized machinery
for a variety of uses; (3) accomplishing the given task in the quick-
est way possible (thus eliminating much of the overhead); and (4)
elimination of whatever expenditures are not expressly or directly de-
voted to the construction of the building.
It would seem obvious from the above that the first expense to be
eliminated is that of safety precautions; this, because adequate safety
measures do not directly produce income, quality, nor do they con-
tribute to expeditious construction. This consequence must follow
if safety measures are not compelled by contract. Under the work-
men's compensation law, a contractor is economically justified in
gambling that no injuries will occur-for even if they do, a relatively
small financial burden will arise. If an owner may escape liability
by contracting over, regardless of safety specifications, it is clear that
he will have received the benefit of low bids without having incurred
any of the risks that the low bids entail. This risk is reserved for the
workman. The end result is that there is no compelling economic
reason for the owner to include safety specifications in the contract
or for the contractor to implement safety measures on the job. In
countenancing such a condition, the courts abdicate their traditional
function as protectors of the helpless, as instruments of social progress.
RIGHT TO RELY ON THE EXPERTISE OF THE ARCHITECT
OR ENGINEER-A FICTION
The architect and engineer enter the picture, whether it be a single
residence or a multi-million dollar project. They contract with the
owner as his agents in securing a quality job at the lowest price.
They agree, for a consideration, to write the bid specifications, and
superintend conformance. Since an aspect of the undertaking in-
volves the safety of persons upon the construction site and a further
aspect involves legal responsibility to pay damages, the architect's
specifications include safety. The only problem is that there may
be no architectural and engineering firm in the United States which is
competent to write construction safety specifications. The recog-
nition of construction hazards and the steps necessary to prevent them
1969]
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from resulting in accidental injury or death require sophisticated
knowledge and a familiarity with principles of safety engineering.
While these firms may have several hundred architects, electrical,
civil and mechanical engineers, few, if any, employ a trained con-
struction safety engineer. They are, therefore, incapable of writing
the contract provisions which will result in an accident-free job. To
attempt to do so borders on willful and wanton misconduct.
The same firm agrees, for a price, to supervise job conformance.
After warning the contractor to "be safe," the architect superin-
tendent and his assistants parade around the job daily, making minute
inspections to see that the nuts and bolts are of a certain quality and
that the paint is of a certain grade-overlooking the fact that the
trenches are not shored, the derricks are improperly rigged, holes are
not covered, scaffolds are unguarded, and workers are working fifty
feet in the air with neither nets nor safety belts. The architectural
firm is not only incompetent to write specifications, it is also in-
competent to supervise conformance.
The ethical standards of the architectural and engineering pro-
fessions will have much more substance when enforced by legal lia-
bility. This has been proven by the increased number of cases in-
volving architects and the trend in holding architects liable. Re-
liance upon the good faith of the architect in allowing the builder
to depart from the safety plans is no defense.144
A 1908 case, Clinton v. Boehm, 4' is a classic example of why the
architect cannot and should not be relied upon. The court con-
cluded that there was no duty to supervise the construction project
and protect the principal from liability. In that case there was a
state statute which required that all elevator shafts be guarded during
construction. A workman recovered judgment against the owner
for injuries received in falling down an unguarded shaft. The owner
attempted to recoup his loss by suing the architect for negligence
in not insisting on proper guards on the shaft. The owner's claim
was rejected on the ground that the duty to supervise construction
did not include the duty to see that guard rails were provided. 14"
The privity theory has been rejected by the courts with respect to
144. See Foelle v. Heintz, 137 Wisc. 169, 118 N.W. 543 (1908).
145. 139 App. Div. 73, 124 N.Y.S. 789 (1908).
146. See id. at 75, 124 N.Y.S. at 792.
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architects, and architects are now held liable unless they use due care.
This was made clear in Montijo v. Swift,'47 in which the court stated:
An architect who plans . . . construction work . . . is under a duty to exercise
ordinary care . . . for the protection of any person who foreseeably and with rea-
sonable certainty may be injured by his failure to do so, even though such injury
may occur after his work has been accepted by the person engaging his services. 1 48
Negligence in supervision was made the cornerstone of the de-
cision in Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp.'49 in which a safety
valve called for in the design of the system had not been installed.
The system, tested by the plumbing subcontractor, resulted in an
explosion. In holding that the architect was liable for the extensive
damage, the court pointed out that if the architect had properly
supervised the work he would have observed the danger in the in-
stallation of the hot water system. The mere fact that the subcon-
tractor had not requested inspection of this system did not relieve
the architect of his responsibility.
The negligence of the architect combined with that of Vince in contributing to the
injury and rendered him liable in solido. One whose negligence combines with
that of another to cause injury cannot plead the negligence of such other as a de-
fense to an action by the injured party. 15 0
DANGER IS OPEN AND OBVIOUS-A FICTION
One of the most cogent aspects of the Gowdy decision was the
manner in which Judge Fox rejected the argument that the plaintiff
could not recover for an "open and obvious" danger. The court
realistically concluded that even the most "reasonable" person could
not be attentive and knowledgable as to hazardous situations. Rely-
ing on the argument that the United States had superior knowledge
they said:
W]e have found that the defendant should have been aware that the plaintiff
would not, while operating the davit, recognize the danger inherent in working on
an unguarded elevated working surface in a concrete and water environment, and
that the absence of a guardrail presented a deceptive and hidden danger to the
plaintiff.1 5 1
147. 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963).
148. Id. at 353, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35.
149. 117 So.2d 104 (1959).
150. Id. at 125. For a discussion of this case see Witherspoon, When Is An
Architect Liable, 48 A.B.A.J. 321, 323, n.22 (1962) wherein the author, indicates
that the lower court decision in Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp. was reversed
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961).
151. 271 F. Supp. 733, 745 (W.D. Mich. 1967).
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In Ackerberg v. Muskegon Osteopathic Hospital,'52 plaintiff
sought to hold defendant liable for its failure to guard an elevated
platform where the absence of the handrail was open, obvious and
known to the plaintiff. A unanimous court in rejecting the de-
fendant's position declared:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors
by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if he (a) knows, or by the
exercise of reasonable care, could discover, the condition which, if known to him,
he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them.'5 3
The significance of this decision is that the court's entire opinion
regarding duty was based upon foreseeability of harm as the decisive
fact question involved. The court did not devote one word to the
antiquated and legally ridiculed argument "that there is no duty if
the condition is open and obvious."
The logic and strength of Gowdy was evidenced when Judge Fox
said it would be incorrect to permit a wrongdoer from escaping lia-
bility on the premise that no duty was owed and the danger was
"open and obvious." A distinction had to be made and he pro-
pounded it in this way:
Cases in which an injured employee of an independent contractor sues a landowner
for injuries sustained as a result of claimed negligence on the part of the landowner
lend themselves to temptations to simplism. It is important in these cases to distin-
guish "between the problem of restricting liability to a negligent party, and the prob-
lem of restricting the liability of the defendant even though he was negligent .. "
This distinction "is one that is fundamental to an understanding of cases involving
personal injuries for open and obvious dangers." 154
This distinction was supported by an authoritative study in this area
cited in a footnote to the opinion. A commentator has observed:
While statements are frequently made that without a duty there can be no negligence,
this is misleading and not in accordance with the usage herein. A driver of a car
can be negligent as a matter of law in failing to give a proper signal when turning
to the left or right and yet not be liable to a passenger-guest who is hurt in precisely
the manner that should have been anticipated. This is because for various reasons of
policy, other than the need for limiting liability in some manner, courts have con-
cluded in view of the relationship between the parties to restrict the defendant's
duty of care. Thus, conduct more reprehensible than negligence must be found to
justify the imposition of liability on a defendant to a passenger-guest in an auto-
mobile or to a trespasser on land. The lack of a duty in such instances does not
mean and should not inean that the defendant has acted prudently. It simply means
152. See Ackerberg v. Muskegon Osteopathic Hosp., 366 Mich. 596, 115 N.W.2d
290 (1962).
153. Id. at 600, 115 N.W.2d at 292.
154. Supra note 151, at 739.
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that even though he was guilty of anti-social conduct and conduct that should be
discouraged, the achievement of other socially desirable ends or objectives that will
be hindered by shifting the loss from the defendant to the plaintiff is a weightier
consideration. Admittedly, a judge will often say that there was no duty to do some-
thing when in reality he means that it could not be said that it was negligence not
to do it. This is unobjectionable since there is no liability without fault, i.e., negli-
gence, but the lack of duty in such a case is covered by the general requirement of
fault, whereas there are numerous examples of non-liability even though the fault
or negligence requirement of liability is satisfied.1 55
The highly respected First Circuit Court of Appeals had the occa-
sion recently to comment on this restrictive view of the landowner's
duty to a business visitor when a defendant contended that knowl-
edge of danger or warning of danger completely discharged de-
fendant's duty:
Connecticut has embraced the more modern trend of opinion which at least partially
rejects the extremely favored position of the landowner in the law of torts. Only
two weeks after the decision in Laube v. Stevenson, supra, the Supreme Court of
Errors in Reboni v. Case Bros., 1951, 137 Conn. 501, 78 A.2d 887, clearly held that
warning does not necessarily discharge the duty of due care. There, two employees
of a general contractor were burned by electrocution upon close approach of a crane
with which they were working, to high-tension wires while doing aerial work above
defendant's factory yard, There was evidence that one of the plaintiffs not only was
familiar with the danger of working near "hot" wires, but he had been warned of
the danger and, indeed, had had personal experience with these wires in the past.
The court, however, pointed to the extremely dangerous condition and held that
the jury was warranted in finding that something more than a warning was required
to discharge defendant's obligation to the plaintiffs. 156
Many of the decisions in the past had been based on the fact that
since there was no "control" over the worksite, the injured persons
should have been aware of the surrounding situation. This was
emphatically rejected by a recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court:
The injured has no control over or relation with the contractor. The contractee,
true, has no control over the doing of the work and in that sense is also innocent
of the wrong doing; but he does have the power of selection, and in the application
of concepts of distributive justice perhaps much can be said for the view that a loss
arising out of the tortious conduct of a financially irresponsible contractor should
fall on the contractee.15 7
155. Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions,
100 U. PA. L. REV. 632, 639 (1952) (emphasis added).
156. Csizmadia v. P. Ballantine & Sons, 287 F.2d 423, 425 (2d Cir. 1961).
157. Majestic Realty Ass'n Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co., 30 N.J. 425, 432,
153 A.2d 321, 325 (1959).
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FICTIONS-THAT EMPLOYEES UNDERSTAND SAFETY ENGINEERING,
AND THAT EMPLOYERS WANT CONSTRUCTION WORKERS
TO "WATCH THEIR STEP"
It is important that lawyers, judges and writers in the tort field
understand our advancing technology. The horrible injury and
death toll is not the fault of a technology which has failed to
recognize hazards, risks and dangers; rather it is the fault of an un-
derdeveloped social policy. The biotechnologists have long played a
key role in recognizing hazards and risks. They have recently made
substantial additional contributions by their research in the area of
risk acceptance which has particular significance in limiting the lia-
bility defeating concepts of contributory negligence and assumption
of the risk.
Although assumption of risk has been used by the courts in several
different senses,'" the use of this defense in relation to principals
employing contractors can easily be shown to be illogical and erro-
neous. The defense of assumption of risk presupposes that the plain-
tiff has knowledge, understands the risk, and that he is acting volun-
tarily."" Assumption of risk also presupposes the gathering of in-
formation through the use of an individual's senses. This, however,
takes much deliberation,"" and the economic aspects of the prin-
cipal-independent contractor relationship requires that no such in-
formation be obtained by the employee.
The applicable law with respect to contributory negligence is stated
in Foster v. Buckner,'"" wherein the court held that contributory
negligence is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. It stated that
the fact that plaintiff was attending to his duties at the time of the in-
jury so that his attention was directed to objects other than the truck
which injured him made contributory negligence a question of fact.
Plaintiff was entitled to rely upon defendant's employees to perform
their duty and to follow the general practice in such cases. In
Mayala v. Underwood Veneer Company,"2 it was contended that the
158. See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA.
L. REV. 122 (1961).
159. See Cincinnati N.O. & T. R.R. v. Thompson, 236 F.1 (6th Cir. 1916).
160. Burner & Rockwell, Information Seeking in Risk Acceptance, AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF SAFETY ENGINEERS JOURNAL 6 (1968).
161. 203 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1953).
162. 281 Mich. 434, 275 N.W. 198 (1937).
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plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence in going under a
log to throw a chain in the course of loading a truck with logs.
The record showed, however, that this was an ordinary incident of
operation. The court determined that under such circumstances it
could not hold plaintiff guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
A claim of contributory negligence may not be predicated upon
the failure of the plaintiff to observe or remember if neglect to do so
is occasioned by his pre-occupation with the purpose for which de-
fendant invited him to the premises, or the physical position he was
required to assume in carrying out that purpose."' 3
Courts and legislatures have long recognized in common law de-
cisions and in statutes that an industrial worker needs special pro-
tection to prevent injury. Liability tends to bring about preventive
and corrective measures. Many persons may have knowledge as to
dangers inherent in a type of work being performed. But with re-
spect to the appreciation of the extent of the danger, only the safety
specialist is. fully cognizant of the accurate assumptions to be made.
This requires training in the recognition of hazards, risks and danger.
Hazard, risk and danger are relative terms. Hazardous in relation
to what; risky in relation to what; dangerous in relation to what?
Statistical experience in the frequency and severity of injury are key
elements. Accident prevention, psychological studies on attention
span, attention arresters, fatigue, monotony, noise, peripheral vision
and epidemiology of injury are all relevant. The recognition in safety
standards, codes, and safe practice data sheets of hazards, risks and
dangers are relevant.
In Gowdy, the lower court rejected the government's position that
the injured plaintiff assumed the risk or was guilty of contributory
negligence. In fact, they rejected its viability in such a factual situ-
ation. The court said:
Defendant's claim that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is unfounded.
From the testimony of defendant's former safety experts, we conclude that the
attention of a reasonable and prudent workman, such as plaintiff, while working on
the second deck of the lighthouse, would be concentrated almost exclusively on his
work effort and that lulled into a sense of security, he could easily be lured into a
163. See Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919); Inouye v. Pac.
Gas & Elec., I Cal. Rptr. 848, 348 P.2d 208 (1959); Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas
& Elec. Co., 145 La. 679, 82 So. 785 (1919); Dennis v. City of Albermarle, 242
N.C. 263, 87 S.E.2d 561 (1955); Johnson v. Rulon, 363 Pa. 585, 70 A.2d 325
(1950); Bloomer v. Snellenburg, 221 Pa. 25, 69 A. 1124 (1908).
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position of danger.
Under such circumstances, a workman would not be guilty of contributory negli-
gence. Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence.
1 6 4
IT WAS NOT INHERENTLY HAZARDOUS
The limited safety sophistication of the trial court often expresses it-
self in the fiction, "it was not inherently dangerous." This article
has discussed a definition of what is inherently hazardous and con-
cluded that this is a jury question.
The recognition of hazards and risks is peculiarly within the scope
of safety engineering. Often the most dangerous hazards are those
which are most innocent in appearance." '  Thus the construction
safety engineer needs all the available tools, which are: (1) safety
standards, codes and safety data sheets; (2) safety manuals; (3)
statistics; (4) case histories; (5) reports of safety conferences; (6)
expert consultants; (7) contract specifications of prudent owners;
(8) safety films; (9) safety libraries; (10) literature of safety equip-
ment manufacturers.
Help for the endangered construction worker should be forthcom-
ing from the Gowdy case, the first in which expert testimony was
offered to prove: (1) that the recognition of hazards and risks is
sophisticated knowledge; (2) that particular construction work was
164. Supra note 151.
165. See, e.g., Grogan v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Ky. 1963) and
West v. Atkinson Construction Co., 59 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1967) in which the court
said scaffolding is not inherently dangerous; yet every construction safety engineer
in the country would testify otherwise, and many states have held scaffolding so
hazardous that they have enacted Scaffolding Acts. In the West case, a floating
scaffold was involved, making the safety problem even more acute. See also, Dees v.
Largess, 1 Mich. App. 421, 136 N.W.2d 715 (1965), wherein the trial court said that
the operation of a crane next to overhead power lines was not inherently hazardous.
In each of these cases and others like them, it must be said that plaintiff's counsel
did not assist the court with expert testimony on how really hazardous the opera-
tion was. It may be just as presumptuous to suggest that the trial court should
have recognized the evidence as sufficient for a jury question, as it was for the court
to presume that a jury could not so infer. A trial judge is not expected to know a
completely separate discipline such as safety engineering and should be assisted by
expert testimony in understanding that what looks simple to him is really much
more complicated.
The operation of a crane near an electric power line is so hazardous that a pru-
dent owner puts extensive language in the contract specifications so that extra ex-
penditure of time and money is known to the contractor and the principal has
complete control. See, e.g., I duPont Engineering Department, supra note 143, at
D13.
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inherently hazardous with an explanation of the subtle character of
the hazards; and (3) what is involved in risk acceptance."'6  Gowdy
should signal the beginning of a trend favoring the use of expert
testimony to assist the court and jury in assessing liability and to dis-
courage the use of defense fictions.
A DEFINITIVE STATEMENT OF THE LAW
Courts have employed many fictions to circumvent the so called
"immunity" expressed by the so called "general rule" to prevent the
harshness and injustice of that rule. The time has come for a defi-
nitive statement of the law.
The following chart represents the Restatement rules interpreted
dynamically and taking into consideration all possible statutory limi-
tations and expansions. It is an expression of law that will markedly
expand past concepts of liability. It will serve until a more moral
society expands fault concepts to strict liability. It should result in as
dramatic a reduction in the injury and death toll as has resulted from
the auto makers decision to use energy absorbing steering columns. 6
There are three basic clarifications made by the chart: (1) It
eliminates a general rule of immunity;16 8 (2) The duty owed is
only limited by the "zone of danger;" (3) Restatement duties are
seen as examples of due care violations rather than mechanical
rules.1 9
166. See testimony of Robert Jenkins, former Chief of Safety of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers and Fred Bisel, former Chief of Safety of the U.S. Coast
Guard, in Gowdy, supra note 8.
167. See Address by Robert Brenner, Deputy Director of National Highway
Safety Bureau, Advancing Human Ecology Through Progress In Safety Research,
Annual Meeting of the American Society of Safety Engineers, August 5, 1968.
See also Larsen v. General Motors, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
168. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) for an excellent
example of a court's willingness to throw out the special treatment land owners
have received.
169. Supra note 87, at 75.
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SUMMARY
The theme of the excellent construction safety handbook of the
duPont Corporation is: "Humans Are Not Expendable-Even By
Fractions." The law can and must make this meaningful in con-
struction. The common law, interpreted dynamically, can do this
by subjecting principals employing contractors to the same require-
ment of due care that binds everyone else in society, and by ending
the confusion generated by judicially approved examples of duty
violations expressed as the parameters of prudent conduct.
